Nationalist and Power-Seeking Leadership Preferences in Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Theory, a Measurement Framework, and Applications to the Breakup of Yugoslavia

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Theoretically, variation in leadership preferences is often taken to be an important predictor of ethno-territorial conflict outcomes. Yet there is a significant gap when it comes to applying this theory. Case studies do not take a consistent approach to measuring leadership preferences, while statistical research tends to omit the variable altogether. This paper suggests a standardized approach to measuring leadership preferences along two dimensions – a dimension that captures the weight given to achieving ideal nationalist goals as against minimizing conflict costs and downside conflict risks, and a dimension that indicates how much intrinsic nationalist goals are valued relative to the goal of taking and maintaining political power. The resulting measurement template is then applied to seven potential ethno-territorial conflicts in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. These cases indicate that leadership preferences may help to explain ethno-territorial conflict outcomes and, at the same time, are sometimes not well predicted by other important variables, such as the balance of power and the pre-conflict status quo.

INTRODUCTION

Ethno-territorial conflicts most commonly involve a state, representing a demographically and politically dominant ethnic group, and organized elements of a sizeable ethnic minority, which both view the same state territory as all or part of their collective homelands. In explaining ethno-territorial conflict outcomes – such as war onset, war duration, war strategy choice, and mode of war termination – what role is likely to be played by leadership preferences? Theoretically, leadership preferences might add significant explanatory power to commonly discussed structural factors, such as the balance of power and the distribution of disputed goods under the initial (status quo) conditions. Rothschild, for example, argues that ‘…the role of leaders in ethnic politics is critical . . .’. Brown points to ‘bad leaders’ as a central proximate cause of conflict. But is it practically feasible to use leadership preferences as a variable, whether in small numbers of case studies or in large-N
statistical studies? The primary purpose of this paper is to offer a general approach to direct measurement of leadership preferences in ethno-territorial conflicts, and then to illustrate its potential explanatory role via case studies of actual and potential conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

In case studies, leadership preferences are often at the center of the explanatory effort, but are not usually coded according to explicit criteria. Across different case studies, this tends to make criteria and categorizations inconsistent. One indicator of this problem is ‘case-relative’ classifications of preferences in a given conflict dyad. Any two leaderships may be characterized as more or less similar – one more or less of an extreme nationalist than the other, or more or less a power-seeker than the other – without reference to whether such similarities or differences are so pronounced in a broader theoretical or comparative perspective.

In statistical studies, leadership preferences are often ignored, or are at most crudely proxied by structural or institutional predictors. When preferences are ignored, this might be based on the argument that preferences are ‘near-tautologically close’ to the war-related dependent variables of interest. But preferences are not the same as outcomes. Below we show that, away from the extremes of intrinsic nationalist preferences – i.e., with the exception of extreme nationalists and non-nationalists – preferences do not imply strong likelihoods of particular outcomes without information on other variables affecting leadership calculations of costs and benefits. If leadership preferences are significant causes, then omitting them from statistical models may yield biased estimates of the impact of the included variables, such as indicators of relative power and status quo conditions. Such bias may exist for two main reasons. First, structural factors such as the balance of power and status quo conditions are plausibly considered to be predictors of leadership preferences. Hence, leadership preferences are likely to be correlated with other explanatory factors. If significant, such correlations yield biased estimates when one or more of the correlated predictors are omitted from the model. Second, as mentioned, the effects of factors such as the balance of power and status quo conditions are often expected to be contingent on the character of leadership preferences. Possibly, variation in leadership preferences merely mediates the effect of other variables without having any independent impact. But that can only be determined by including leadership preferences in the model specifications.

We begin by reviewing the theoretical case for the explanatory importance of leadership preferences in a conflict bargaining framework. We then propose measures of the two most widely discussed dimensions of leadership preferences: a nationalist goals dimension that assesses how strongly maximum nationalist goals are valued relative to the conflict costs and downside outcome risks that might be incurred in pursuing them; and a principled–unprincipled dimension that assesses how much pursuing and maintaining political power (‘power-seeking’) is valued relative to intrinsic nationalist and other political goals. Utilizing the conflict bargaining framework, we then apply the proposed measures of preferences alongside two widely studied cost-benefit variables – relative power and the status
distribution of contested goods – to explain seven potential conflict onsets during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.

LEADERSHIP PREFERENCES AND ETHNO-TERRITORIAL WAR ONSET: THEORY

How are leadership preferences expected to affect conflict outcomes? Here we look at war onset, which is the focus of the case studies below. The theory can also be used or developed to explain other conflict outcomes, such as war-fighting strategy choice, war duration, and mode of war termination.7

In a standard bargaining theory of war onset, it is assumed that two players struggle for control over disputed goods – in potential ethno-territorial conflicts, primarily sovereignty and administration over disputed territory and related policy outcomes. Either player may choose to deviate from the status quo conditions to start a crisis (i.e., to threaten to start a war); if the crisis cannot be ended with a mutually agreed bargain to change the status quo distribution of disputed goods, then more intense conflict (war) results. Three variables determine whether the outcome is no deviation from the status quo, a mutually agreed bargain to move to a new status quo, or war. First, relative power determines the expected outcome of war – more precisely, the probability that each side will win or lose all of the disputed goods – and also the costs each side incurs in starting a crisis and in fighting a war. Second, the status quo is the initial distribution of disputed goods, which determines how much the expected war outcome – and any mutually agreed bargain that avoids war – are expected to change the distribution for better or worse. Third, preferences determine, for intrinsic nationalists, how much the status quo is valued relative to the expected changes in the status quo and the costs due to crisis and war, and, for power-seeking leaders, how much the expected political consequences of crisis and war are valued relative to the political status quo under peace.

In the formal Addendum below, we show that greater relative power and a smaller share of status quo goods make it more likely that a given side will initiate a crisis.8 While crisis initiation is necessary for war onset to occur, it is not sufficient. Many factors, including leadership preferences, might prevent a crisis from being resolved short of war.9 We then show that if either side has sufficiently extreme nationalist preferences – preferences that disproportionately value ideal outcomes potentially obtainable through war relative to the status quo or the less ideal outcome obtainable through a mutually agreed bargain – then both crisis and war ensue. We also show that if either side has sufficiently power-seeking leadership preferences, and if political benefits to crisis and war exceed those of either the status quo or a crisis-induced, mutually agreed bargain, then, again, crisis and war occur.

In empirical applications, these results imply the following probabilistic hypotheses about when a peaceful status quo is expected to give way to crisis and, possibly, war:
Hypothesis 1: In a potential ethno-territorial conflict dyad, a shift in relative power makes the gaining side more likely to move away from a peaceful status quo to initiate crisis and conflict.

Hypothesis 2: In a potential ethno-territorial conflict dyad, a shift in the distribution of the disputed goods (in the status quo conditions) makes the adversely affected side more likely to move away from a peaceful status quo to initiate crisis and conflict.

Hypothesis 3: In a potential ethno-territorial conflict dyad, a change toward more extreme nationalist leadership preferences makes that leadership more likely to move away from a peaceful status quo to initiate crisis and conflict.

Hypothesis 4: In a potential ethno-territorial conflict dyad, a change toward leadership with more power-seeking preferences, which is more insecure politically, and which has sufficient relative power, makes that leadership more likely to move away from a peaceful status quo to initiate crisis and conflict.

LEADERSHIP PREFERENCES IN ETHNO-TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS: A MEASUREMENT TEMPLATE

How might theoretical variation in leadership preferences – along the moderate–extreme nationalist and principled–unprincipled dimensions – be measured? Table 1 summarizes relevant types of evidence in the sort of template that might be used to code data consistently over a large number of cases. A crucial requirement is that all such evidence must be distinct from the dependent variable (or variables) of interest in a given study. Below, we propose two ways to satisfy this requirement. To flesh out this section’s logical discussion of the different types of evidence, we illustrate using examples of executive leaders from the former Yugoslavia at the time of the breakup in 1990–1995. The illustrations focus on showing differences between former Yugoslav leaders – how, based on a given type of evidence, one appears to be more or less strongly nationalist than another, or more or less principled than another. The online Appendix has filled-out templates for all of the leaderships discussed in the paper, and also a range of ideal-types illustrating ordinal rankings along each dimension. For purposes of coding large numbers of leadership preferences, the Appendix proposes and defines five interval-rankings or ideal-types of nationalist preferences – non-nationalist, moderate nationalist, ordinary nationalist, strong nationalist, and extreme nationalist – and three interval-rankings or ideal-types along the principled–unprincipled dimension – strongly unprincipled, balanced, and strongly principled. In this section, we explain the types of evidence used to make codings. In the next, explanatory section, we use the codings given in the Appendix to help explain war onset (and non-onset) in the former Yugoslavia in 1990–1995.

Consider first the information relevant to coding preferences on the moderate–extremist dimension. As discussed, more moderate leaders are more willing to
To trade off ideal collective goals to reduce downside costs and outcome risks. What evidence is available to demonstrate where a given leader lies on this dimension?

During the period in which conflict outcomes are being examined, there are statements and actions that bear directly on constraining pursuit of ideal nationalist goals to minimize downside costs and outcome risks. The template separates statements from actions. This is necessary because actions indicating preferences may include various outcomes that researchers study as dependent variables – such as war onset, use of various strategies of war, war duration, and mode of war termination. It must be possible to exclude such information from that used to code leadership preferences. There are two main approaches to doing so. One is to exclude all information about actions indicating the nature and extent of nationalist goals and the costs and risks accepted in pursuing them. This minimizes the danger

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<td>Moderate vs. extreme nationalist dimension</td>
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<td>(1) Statements indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs</td>
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<td>(2) Actions indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment</td>
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<td>(3) Indirect evidence in the time period examined: moderation or extremism concerning other political goals or in personal life</td>
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<td>(4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict</td>
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<td>(5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations</td>
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Principled vs. unprincipled dimension

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<th>Indicator</th>
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<td>(6) Consistency of stated nationalist goals; and consistency of strategies with stated nationalist goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict</td>
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<td>(7) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict</td>
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<td>(8) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict</td>
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<td>(9) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders</td>
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that information on the dependent variable of interest might contaminate measurement of leadership preferences, but at the cost of excluding information on all the other types of action. The alternative approach is to omit information only on the action or actions to be explained, while retaining information on other types of action. While this maximizes the information available to code preferences, it requires the information used to be modified as the dependent variable changes. Although we do not endorse the latter approach, we also do not exclude it, and therefore we include ‘actions’ in row 2 of the template.

How reliable are statements and actions that appear to indicate preferences directly? Statements about preferences may be disingenuous – intended to serve power-seeking aims, or to lull or intimidate the enemy falsely. Similarly, actions may sometimes be consistent with serving different objectives. That is why evidence of statements and actions should be collected over as long a period as possible, to look for consistent patterns and to find situations where different objectives would imply different statements or actions.

For example, some statements or actions indicating a high tolerance for costs and risks may help to determine that a leadership is on the more extreme end of the moderate–extremist spectrum, without distinguishing well between the possibilities that nationalist goals are primary, or that they are being used in the service of the higher goal of power. But then other evidence may help to rule out one of these remaining interpretations.

Beginning in the late 1980s, leaders of Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia, and the Bosnian Muslims all made statements promising to use force if necessary to secure nationalist goals, such as independence and control of all territory claimed as their homeland. In contrast, leaders of the Kosovo Albanians, Macedonia, and the Macedonian Albanians did not make such statements endorsing the use of force – although the Kosovo Albanians eventually declared independence outright rather than seek to negotiate over their goals. As discussed below, Serbia was in the strongest power position to use force effectively, particularly vis-à-vis the Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians. The Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians were in the weakest power position. In terms of will to bear high costs and risks to pursue ideal goals, then, the Bosnian Muslim leadership was closest to the more extreme end of the moderate–extremist spectrum. But note that these examples do not illustrate the extremes of the spectrum. For example, none of the leaders endorsing violence faced the kind of overwhelmingly superior enemy that, for example, confronts small ethnic minorities in China or Russia.

Another potentially telling indicator is treatment of opponents within one’s own group. At the extreme, this would mean initiating violence against political opponents to monopolize the own-group political space. Similar but less extreme behaviors would include commonly violating the law or bending the rules to impose one’s political will within one’s own party or within own-group mass media or political institutions or, still less extreme, being less tolerant of other viewpoints within one’s own party or institutions. Less extreme nationalist leaders will be much more hesitant to target their own group, both for intrinsic reasons and because such a
process tends to lead either to dictatorship through intimidation or to wider civil conflict. On the other hand, initiating use of force to impose one’s political will against one’s own group – as done only by Serbia’s Milošević in the former Yugoslavia – is consistent with either more extreme nationalist or strongly power-seeking preferences, so that other evidence is necessary to determine which objective was primary. More limited forms of own-group intolerance – bending the rules, demanding loyalty within the party – were employed by Tudjman in Croatia and by Izetbegović among the Bosnian Muslims.

Treatment of the rival ethnic or national group is another relevant type of evidence. More moderate nationalist leaders are more likely to make an effort to secure minimum conditions for the rival group, sometimes even at significant cost or risk to their own-group objectives. Here again Milošević had the worst record in former Yugoslavia, followed by Tudjman and Izetbegović.

Apart from direct statements and actions in pursuit of nationalist goals, there may be other indirect, pre-conflict period or post-conflict period evidence relevant to distinguishing more moderate nationalists from relative extremists. Does the leader exhibit greater moderation or extremism in pursuing other, non-nationalist objectives? For example, nationalist objectives may be pursued as part of a larger ideological agenda that is relatively extreme – such as communism or Islamism. Izetbegović’s nationalism was part of a definite, though purposefully vague, Islamist agenda. Are there patterns and anecdotes from personal life that cast leaders in a more moderate or extreme light? For example, Tudjman infamously declared, ‘Thank God my wife is not a Jew or a Serb.’ Such indirect evidence by itself is likely to be weak. Moderation or extremism in other policy areas or in personal life may be associated with similar moderation or extremism in pursuit of nationalist goals – but this is not necessarily the case. Although such evidence may not be helpful in many or even most cases, it may not be wise to ignore it altogether.

What evidence of moderation or extremism – particularly in pursuit of nationalist goals – exists in the leader’s statements and actions before and after the potential conflict period in which preferences are examined as an explanatory variable? Behavior in earlier and later periods of a leader’s life and career may furnish important evidence about long-held preferences. But it is also possible that preferences may change over time. Another shortcoming of indirect, early and late evidence is that conditions may not be favorable for revealing relevant preferences. Particularly, in earlier periods, little opportunity may have existed for leaders to pursue relevant goals – whether or not these goals were held at the time. Even to the extent such opportunity existed, there may be little information available about the early lives and careers of leaders. That said, early and late direct evidence may provide important corroboration of other, more direct and proximate evidence – even if it is not conclusive by itself. Thus, Milošević had a long and successful career as a communist apparatchik. Milošević’s behavior is certainly unusual for a genuine nationalist, although it is possible that he underwent a genuine ‘conversion’ in 1987. Tudjman does seem to have undergone such a conversion. He fought with the communist partisans in World War II and rose to become a general in the Yugoslav
People’s Army. But he joined the Croatian Spring nationalist movement in the late 1960s and was predictably purged and imprisoned for his views. Similarly, Izetbegović was twice imprisoned for his early political activities – once for his teenage membership in the fascist-leaning Muslim Youth during the 1940s, and later for advocating pan-Muslim religious nationalism in the early 1980s.

Leadership recruitment is another important type of evidence. Leaders are likely to encourage the rise of own-group leaders that advance their objectives, while discouraging the rise of own-group leaders that threaten their objectives. Extremists will tend to promote other extremists that hew strictly to their ideological line. More moderate nationalists are likely to encourage other leaders of their type, but are also likely to be more tolerant of leaders with different preferences over nationalist goals. Here Milošević seemed less concerned with ideological consistency than with avoiding challenges to his own power (see below). Both Tudjman and Izetbegović cultivated broad center-right nationalist parties to maximize their political appeal and influence, thereby incorporating rival ideological currents. At the same time, both sought successfully to maintain dominant organizational positions, so that dissenters could not seize control of the party leadership.

Moving to the second dimension of preferences, more unprincipled leaders are likely to use force against own-group political rivals, in the manner of more extreme nationalists. But many other types of information are relevant. Over time, less principled leaders would be expected to make a greater number of more obviously inconsistent statements about their nationalist preferences and their other goals (Table 1, row 6). That said, significant consistency or inconsistency of leaders’ statements, while suggestive, is not necessarily definitive. Unprincipled power-seekers always have an incentive to claim that they are sincere nationalists of one stripe or another. Also, principled nationalists may sometimes misrepresent their preferences to gain support or concessions from domestic or foreign audiences; and principled leaders may sincerely change their preferences over time. Nevertheless, evidence of significant ideological consistency or inconsistency is still potentially important, especially when considered alongside other evidence. Tudjman and Izetbegović became active as nationalists long before it was politically convenient, and thereafter their ideological positions remained largely unchanged. Milošević was all over the place, becoming an overnight nationalist when the political winds shifted in the mid-to-late 1980s, and then posing as a more moderate or more extreme nationalist as internal and external political conditions changed during the 1990s.

In identifying unprincipled leaders, actions may often speak louder than words. Strongly power-seeking leaderships can be distinguished most reliably by policies that, while justified as serving self-proclaimed nationalist goals, actually tend to damage such goals in a predictable manner. Instead, such own-group-defeating policies may serve shorter-term power goals. Similarly, more principled leaders are more likely to risk actions that threaten their power, if such actions can be reasonably expected to advance their ideological goals. Strong power-seekers will obviously seek to avoid such actions. The same distinction exists for actions that would be expected to endanger the personal safety of leaders. Particularly, once in

NATIONALIST AND POWER-SEEKING LEADERSHIP PREFERENCES 515

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power, strong power-seekers would not be expected to risk their personal safety to serve the proclaimed cause in the same way as more principled leaders might.

Here there is a marked contrast between Milošević and other leaders. Milošević undertook repeated military adventures that conveniently benefited him during periods when the Serbian opposition became more mobilized. At the same time, he often initiated or fought wars in a way that unnecessarily led international opinion and the western great powers to support Serbia’s rivals. In the short run, Serbia’s foes were too weak to threaten Milošević’s power directly. But Milošević’s methods had disastrous long-term consequences for Serbian nationalist goals, particularly in Croatia and Kosovo. Milošević continued to use these methods for long after the negative effects were clear. By contrast, Tudjman and Izetbegović were more cautious about initiating and fighting wars – frequently delaying conflict, changing their strategies and tactics, or agreeing to compromise on final outcomes to make sure that they did not unnecessarily alienate international opinion or important allies. At times, Tudjman and Izetbegović also risked arrest, imprisonment, and possibly even death, as did Rugova in Kosovo.

Again, there is other, indirect conflict-period evidence relevant to distinguishing power-seekers from principled leaders. Does the leader appear to pursue non-nationalist goals other than power in a sincere way? Is there evidence that proclaimed non-nationalist goals have been sacrificed for short-term political gain? Has a leader risked power or personal safety for the sake of important non-nationalist goals? Is there evidence of unprincipled behavior in the leader’s personal life? For example, consider the issue of corruption. Leaders may be personally corrupt, sacrificing supposed principles in the pursuit of wealth for themselves or their families. Even if there is no evidence of personal corruption, corruption may be used on a larger or smaller scale in pursuit of power. Of course, some amount of corruption is inextricable from politics, in the sense that leaders almost invariably strive to strengthen their own political coalition at the expense of the opposition. However, as corruption grows, it can significantly undermine economic performance and thus threaten a variety of collective goals. Massive corruption does not necessarily indicate a strongly power-seeking leadership, because more extreme leaders may also tolerate such corruption as a necessary evil if they perceive no other way to achieve their ideal goals. Nevertheless, evidence of extensive corruption may be suggestive of leadership preferences, particularly when considered alongside other evidence. Significant patronage-type corruption, designed to maintain control over the ruling party and build a broad supporting coalition of clients, was used by Milošević, Tudjman, and Izetbegović. Milošević’s commitments to socialism or market reform went through vicissitudes similar to his nationalism. Corruption also occurred on a much more systematic scale in Serbia, doing greater unnecessary damage to national economic performance and military capacity. Both Tudjman and Izetbegović were more consistently committed to market reform, but both also did not hesitate to compromise market reform where this helped to build capacity and support for more strongly valued nationalist goals.
Leadership recruitment within one’s own group is again relevant. Unprincipled leaders tend to promote or assist other unprincipled leaders, but will avoid promoting unprincipled leaders that are personally ambitious. In contrast, principled leaders are more likely to promote or assist other principled leaders, and are more likely to tolerate or assist other strong, independent leaders expected to serve the common cause. Milošević sought to weaken or marginalize nationalist leaders that became too popular, such as the more moderate Milan Panić or the more extremist Vojislav Šešelj. This indicates greater regard for his own power position than for Serbian nationalist goals. On the other hand, both Tudjman and Izetbegović sought to mobilize broad catch-all parties to pursue their nationalist goals, and in the process helped to establish significant political challengers – such as Stjepan Mesić in Croatia and Haris Silajdžić in Bosnia.

WAR ONSET IN THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE MEDIATING ROLE OF LEADERSHIP PREFERENCES

For the seven potential ethno-territorial conflict dyads examined at the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia, Table 2 shows codings of leadership preferences as well as rankings of status quo conditions and relative power. Note that each potential conflict dyad appears twice, in the form of a ‘directed dyad.’ Theoretically, each side of a dyad may initiate crisis and conflict, and the variables indicate which side is expected to be more likely to initiate crisis and conflict.

Let us now turn to classifications of leadership preferences, which are based on the information in the filled-out templates in the online Appendix. On the moderate–extremist dimension, as strong nationalists, we have Franjo Tudjman (Croatia) vis-a-vis Serbia, Alija Izetbegović (Bosnian Muslims) vis-a-vis Serbia and Croatia, and most of the time, Slobodan Milošević (Serbia) vis-a-vis Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia; as ordinary nationalists, Lojze Peterle (Slovenia) vis-a-vis Serbia, Ibrahim Rugova (Kosovo Albanians) vis-a-vis Serbia, Franjo Tudjman (Croatia) vis-a-vis Bosnia, and Arben Xhaferi (Macedonian Albanians) vis-a-vis Macedonia; as moderate nationalists, Milan Kučan (Slovenia) vis-a-vis Serbia, Kiro Gligorov (Macedonia) vis-a-vis Serbia and the Macedonian Albanians, and Nevzat Halili (Macedonian Albanians) vis-a-vis Macedonia; and as non-nationalist, Slobodan Milošević (Serbia) vis-a-vis Slovenia and Macedonia. On the principled–unprincipled dimension, we have Slobodan Milošević (Serbia) as strongly unprincipled, Milan Kučan (Slovenia) and Kiro Gligorov (Macedonia) as balanced, and the other leaders as strongly principled. Note that four leaders – Milošević, Tudjman, Izetbegović, and Gligorov – are involved in more than one potential conflict dyad. As the examples of Milošević and Tudjman indicate, leadership preferences need not be the same across all potential ethno-territorial conflicts. This is because the various potentially contested territories are not necessarily of equal value in nationalist ideologies, or by extension, as vehicles for diversionary political gain. Also, we note two situations where executive power was shared – between Kučan and Peterle in Slovenia, and in 1994–1995, between Halili and Xhaferi for
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<td>Serbia–Croatia&lt;sup&gt;a,b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.58&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>(4.3), (4.1)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>(2.1), (2.2), 1990–1994</td>
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<sup>a</sup> First unit in dyad initiated crisis rather than accept the status quo.

<sup>b</sup> Conflict (war) resulted because crisis could not be resolved by mutually preferable change in status quo that both sides preferred to conflict.

<sup>c</sup> Relative power estimate not adjusted for more limited objective of taking and holding ethnic kin territory or for significant geographical barriers.
the Macedonian Albanians. For purposes of predicting war onset in these two cases, the more conflict-prone of the preferences of ‘dual leaders’ are most relevant.\textsuperscript{17}

Consider now the rankings of the status quo. After the death of Josip Broz Tito, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began to practice a unique form of authoritarian federalism.\textsuperscript{18} Each of the six republics – Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro – and two autonomous provinces – Serbia’s Kosovo and Vojvodina – had its own League of Communists (LC), which had control over most internal affairs. Federal powers and policies, such as control over the Yugoslav People’s Army, were controlled by a collective presidency, in which each republic and autonomous province had one vote. In the abstract, the ideal status quo gives an ethno-national group full independence on all of the territory claimed as its homeland. In a less-than-ideal federal arrangement, it is better for an ethno-national group to have maximum local autonomy, to have as much of its claimed homeland as possible included in its federally allocated territory, and to have influence at the federal level greater than or equal to its share of the population. There was also the issue of which republics or autonomous provinces gained or lost the most as a result of federal policies, such as inter-regional income transfers.

Taking all of these criteria together, the best-off ethno-national groups were the Macedonians and the Bosnian Muslims, and at a somewhat lower level, the Kosovo Albanians; and the worst-off ethno-national groups were the Macedonian Albanians, and at a somewhat higher level, the Serbs. The Macedonians had federal autonomy on substantially all of their claimed territory,\textsuperscript{19} and had a disproportionately large share of federal power relative to their population. The Bosnian Muslims had federal autonomy on a territory much larger than their ethnic settlement footprint, were the first-among-equals of the three large Bosnian ethnic groups within the Bosnian LC, and had a disproportionately large share of federal power relative to their population. The Kosovo Albanians had an autonomous province (though this remained technically part of the Serbian Republic) on substantially all of their claimed territory, and had a disproportionately large share of federal power. By contrast, the Macedonian Albanians had no autonomous region at all and only weak representation within the Macedonian LC. While Serbia did have republic status, it was dramatically under-represented at the federal level relative to its population; Serbia had large concentrations of ethnic kin in Croatia and Bosnia that might be included in an enlarged homeland territory; and alone of all republics with significant ethnic minorities, it had autonomous regions hived off from its territory and given full representation in the federal presidency. Croatia and Slovenia were in the middle. Slovenia included substantially all Slovene territory, and was slightly over-represented at the federal level relative to its population. Croatia included most Croat territory claimed as part of its homeland, and the Bosnian Croats had substantial influence within the Bosnian LC; and Croats were only slightly under-represented relative to their population. Inter-regional income transfers – disproportionately taken from Slovenia and to a lesser extent Croatia, and disproportionately benefiting Kosovo and Macedonia – were no longer large by the
late 1980s. Slovenes and Croats most strongly felt that the Yugoslav economic system impeded their development – although this feeling was also widespread among other peoples. Table 2 shows these relative positions arrayed on a 1–5 scale, with 5 being the worst.

There were pronounced differences in relative power. To begin with, we use a simple ranking based on pre-breakup economic strength – using Yugoslav gross material product (GMP) statistics on the republics and autonomous provinces from 1988. We then deduct the strength of potential secessionist minorities from home republics and, where relevant, add these to the strength of ethnic kin republics. Table 2 shows the resulting relative GMP ratios for each of the directed dyads.

Such rankings do not take account of differences in objectives in a potential conflict or of some major geographical barriers. In our cases, the most important difference in objectives is between contesting control over all of the territory of the weaker side of a directed dyad and only that portion where ethnic kin have concentrated settlement. It is much more difficult to take or hold a territory where another ethnic group has dominant settlement. For example, Serbia might have sought to impose control over all of Croatia or only the Croatian regions where Serbs had concentrated settlement. The same is true for Serbia and Croatia vis-à-vis Bosnia. In practice, Serbia and Croatia sought the more limited objective of ethnic kin territory in these cases. In contrast, Serbia’s potential objective vis-à-vis Slovenia was to control all of Slovenia’s territory – since there were no significant Serb regions in Slovenia and no other major objectives that were a likely cause of war. The same was true for Serbia’s objectives vis-à-vis Macedonia. For Serbia vis-à-vis Kosovo, and for Macedonia vis-à-vis the Macedonian Albanians, the main objective was to maintain centralized rule over all territory densely settled by the Albanians. If the relative GMP rankings are used as indicators of relative power where the weaker side’s entire territory is contested, they would tend to underestimate the relative strength of sides with objectives limited to smaller regions where kin groups enjoy concentrated settlement. Major geographical barriers also require further adjustments to some relative power estimates. Reliable Serbian control over Serb regions of Croatia required occupation either of large, non-Serb parts of Croatia, or of parts of Bosnia, or some combination of the two. Roughly, this tended to offset the relative power benefit to Serbia of seeking the more limited objective of the heavily Serb regions in a conflict with Croatia. By similar reasoning, reliable Serbian control over Slovenia required occupation of nearly all of Croatia. Therefore, to take account of how relative power is likely to affect pursuit of such more limited or geographically difficult objectives, there should be some additional upward adjustment of the relative power of Serbia vis-à-vis the Bosnian Muslims, of Croatia vis-à-vis the Bosnian Muslims, and of Slovenia vis-à-vis Serbia.

To summarize, the overall ordering of relative GMP from greatest to narrowest advantage falls roughly into four groups, as follows: Serbia–Kosovo; Serbia–Macedonia, followed closely by Serbia–Bosnian Muslims; Croatia–Bosnian Muslims, followed closely by Macedonia–Macedonian Albanians; and Serbia–Slovenia,
followed closely by Serbia–Croatia. If only more limited ethnic kin territory objectives are pursued by Serbia in Croatia and Bosnia and by Croatia in Bosnia, and if major geographical barriers are taken into account, it would be reasonable to adjust the rough GMP-based ordering as follows: Serbia–Bosnian Muslims would be closer to the case of Serbia–Kosovo, and Croatia–Bosnian Muslims closer to Serbia–Macedonia; and Serbia–Slovenia would form a fifth group, given that the combined GMPs of Slovenia and Croatia were roughly the same as that of Serbia. These adjustments yield, from greatest to least advantage, Serbia–Kosovo Albanians and Serbia–Bosnian Muslims, Serbia–Macedonia and Croatia–Bosnian Muslims, Macedonia–Macedonian Albanians, Serbia–Croatia, and Serbia–Slovenia.

What was the actual pattern of crisis and conflict initiation, in 1990–1995, during the period when Yugoslavia broke up? Some examples illustrate the common observation that it may be difficult to say which side initiates a conflict, in the sense that both sides may make credible commitments to go to war rather than accept the \textit{status quo}. Also, while one or both sides may be committed to go to war rather than accept the \textit{status quo}, it is possible that, after a crisis is initiated, a bargain exists that avoids war through an agreed adjustment of the \textit{status quo}. Thus, Serbia initiated crises with the Kosovo Albanians and with Macedonia, in the sense that only Serbia was committed to go to war rather than accept the \textit{status quo}. On the other hand, in the Serbia–Slovenia, Serbia–Croatia, Serbia–Bosnian Muslims, and Croatia–Bosnian Muslims dyads, both sides made commitments to go to war rather than accept the \textit{status quo}. In the Serbia–Kosovo Albanians case, there was no war because the Kosovo Albanians chose not to use force against the changes imposed by Serbia. In the Serbia–Slovenia and Serbia–Macedonia cases, there was no conflict because there was a change in the \textit{status quo} that both sides preferred to war. Conflict occurred between Serbia and Croatia, between Serbia and the Bosnian Muslims, and soon also between Croatia and the Bosnian Muslims, because there was no alternative to the \textit{status quo} that both sides preferred to war. Last, both Macedonia and the Macedonian Albanians accepted the internal Macedonian \textit{status quo} rather than initiate a crisis.

Suppose first that leadership preferences are left aside, and only relative power and the \textit{status quo} are used as predictors of conflict onset. Where the \textit{status quo} is highly adverse and the balance of power highly favorable, crisis initiation would be most likely. Where the \textit{status quo} is highly favorable and the balance of power highly unfavorable, crisis initiation is least likely. Where the \textit{status quo} is highly favorable, then even as the balance of power becomes more favorable, crisis initiation remains unlikely. Away from these one-sided configurations, similar logic applies, but confident predictions become harder to make. Roughly speaking, we can say that crisis initiation makes war onset more likely, but relative power and \textit{status quo} distributions alone do not provide reliable information about whether or not a crisis initiated by one side is likely to be resolved by a bargain short of war. Note, too, that to the extent we are interested in explaining changes from peace to war, it is relative power that changed in the late 1980s – particularly due to the Yugoslav
state’s institutional paralysis. Give such changes in relative power, status quo conditions remained relevant as complementary predictors.

Taking changed relative power and the status quo as predictors for the Yugoslavia cases, the most conflict-prone directional dyads (both predictors conflict-prone) are Serbia–Kosovo Albanians and Serbia–Bosnian Muslims, then Serbia–Macedonia, Croatia–Bosnian Muslims, and Serbia–Croatia. The next group, conflict-prone mainly in terms of the status quo, but with relative power not among the most adverse cases, includes Macedonian Albanians–Macedonia, Croatia–Serbia, Serbia–Slovenia, and Slovenia–Serbia. A less conflict-prone directed dyad group, with both a favorable status quo and adverse relative power, includes Bosnian Muslims–Serbia, Bosnian Muslims–Croatio, Kosovo Albanians–Serbia, and Macedonia–Serbia. Macedonia–Macedonia Albanians, with a highly favorable status quo, would also be less conflict-prone.

Consider now what is added by leadership preferences. Potential for conflict would be expected to be highest where either side has extreme nationalist preferences – particularly where the other side does not have non-nationalist preferences. Similarly, potential for conflict would be expected to be lowest where either side has non-nationalist preferences – particularly where the other side does not have extreme nationalist preferences. Away from these extremes, expectations depend more on preferences taken jointly, and are also conditional on relative power and on the status quo. Within the intermediate (moderate to strong nationalist, balanced to strongly principled) range, preferences are expected to matter more as an average, since less extreme, more principled leaders are more likely to make concessions to avoid or reduce the costs of war. A more favorable balance of power and a more unfavorable status quo would be expected to increase the likelihood of conflict initiation from either side. So there is a potential war initiation from each side, with the probability being highest with jointly more extreme preferences, a greater power advantage, and a more adverse status quo. For strongly power-seeking preferences, war is politically dangerous if victory or at least stalemate is not expected. So war is likely to be conditional on a favorable balance of power, and is more likely with a more unfavorable status quo. In addition, political environments with greater potential diversionary benefits – particularly where there is significant internal political instability or a strong internal political opposition challenge – are also necessary to make conflict more likely. So the general conditions under which a highly unprincipled leader is expected to go to war are similar to those of a more principled, moderate-to-strong nationalist, but there is the additional requirement that a threatening internal political situation exist to deliver significant diversionary benefits.26 We also note that, as with relative power, there were significant changes in leadership preferences in the late 1980s and early 1990s – due to the Yugoslav state’s institutional paralysis and simultaneous political change in the republics and autonomous provinces.

The ranking of conflict-proneness in the Yugoslav cases would be as follows. With both sides either highly power-seeking, with high political threats and high relative power, or strong (though not extreme) nationalist, we have Serbia–Bosnian...
Muslims, Bosnian Muslims–Serbia, Serbia–Croatia, and Croatia–Serbia. Somewhat less conflict-prone is Bosnian Muslims–Croatia and Croatia–Bosnian Muslims, because it is possible, though not likely, that more moderate but also more powerful Croatian leaders either accede to what Bosnian Muslim leaders demand or themselves demand no more than what Bosnian Muslim leaders are willing to accept. The next less conflict-prone group would be Serbia–Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Albanians–Serbia, because in these cases the more moderate side of the dyad is much weaker and hence much more likely to make the concessions necessary to avoid war. Macedonian Albanians–Macedonia is also less conflict-prone, because the moderate Macedonian Albanians would be unlikely to challenge the *status quo* given the adverse balance of power. Similarly, for Macedonia–Macedonian Albanians, moderate Macedonian leaders would be unlikely to challenge a favorable *status quo*, despite a favorable power balance. Last, the least conflict-prone cases are Serbia–Slovenia, Slovenia–Serbia, Serbia–Macedonia, and Macedonia–Serbia, because one side of each dyad does not have nationalist objectives that conflict with those of the other side. In particular, Serbia did not have nationalist objectives that conflicted with those of Slovenia and Macedonia.

As would be expected, the most notable changes in the conflict-likelihood ordering are due to leadership preferences that are not well predicted by relative power and the *status quo*. The Bosnian Muslims become more likely both to initiate war and to be targeted by war, because the leadership preferences are more strongly nationalist than is predicted by the *status quo* and the balance of power. Similarly, the Macedonian Albanians become less likely to initiate war because their leadership preferences are more moderate than would be expected. Last, it is not possible to determine from relative power and *status quo* rankings alone that Serbia will define its nationalist objectives such that they do not conflict with those of Slovenia and Macedonia. This depended on Milošević’s ultimate decision to address Serbia’s grievances (and seek power for himself) through a narrower Serbian nationalist agenda, rather than by recentralizing LC rule over all of Yugoslavia. Had Milošević stuck with the recentralization strategy, there would almost certainly have been a war with Slovenia – initiated by Serbia or Slovenia or both. At the same time, there would almost certainly not have been a war with Macedonia – because the moderate Macedonian leadership would have continued to seek compromise to avoid war. The examples also point to counterfactuals in other directed dyads, where more moderate leadership preferences on one or both sides might have reduced the probability of war onset, and more extreme or power-seeking preferences on one or both sides might have increased it.

CONCLUSIONS

Leadership preferences can be viewed as a mediating variable that may significantly increase overall explanatory power. Structural variables such as relative power and the *status quo* are likely to explain much of the variation in leadership preferences.
But where they fail to do so, they cease to be reliable predictors of conflict outcomes when taken alone. Nevertheless, except in cases where leadership preferences take extreme values, relative power and the status quo continue to be important predictors of war outcomes when taken jointly with leadership preferences. Therefore, adding leadership preferences explicitly, in addition to increasing overall explanatory power of the model, has a second significant benefit: structural predictors are more accurately understood as having two qualitatively different impacts on war outcomes. Structural predictors do not just have direct impacts – impacts that are conditional on leadership preferences. Just as importantly, their indirect effects through leadership preferences are also likely to have a significant, though qualitatively different, impact.

In large-sample, statistical tests of predictors of ethno-territorial conflict outcomes, measurement is likely to be the biggest obstacle to incorporating leadership preferences as an explanatory variable. But measuring leadership preferences does not seem to be qualitatively more difficult or more subject to error than measuring other widely used variables, such as relative power or the nature of the status quo. For example, the Yugoslav cases show that simple approaches to measuring relative power can produce significant measurement errors. The same may also be true for measures that omit important aspects of the status quo. Even after refinements are made to minimize measurement error, significant problems are likely to remain. The danger of measurement error implies that measures should be refined as much as possible. It does not imply that imperfectly measured but theoretically significant variables should be excluded altogether. Here we have sought only to begin the process of formulating a more consistent and robust approach to measuring leadership preferences in potential ethno-territorial conflicts. Other researchers will no doubt suggest significant refinements.

If leadership preferences prove to be significant predictors of ethno-territorial conflict outcomes, future research will take them to be an important dependent variable. We have already mentioned that the main structural factors of the conflict bargaining framework – relative power and status quo conditions – are obvious dependent variables of interest. Then there is a huge literature pointed to institutional dependent variables. The democratic peace literature would point to more or less democratic institutions, and other research to varieties of authoritarian and democratic institutions. The political culture literature points to ideological traditions and related historical events. At this stage, we note only that we would expect these promising explanatory variables to leave a large unexplained residual.

If leadership preferences matter, then it follows that uncertainty about such preferences also matters. Depending upon the bargaining situation, leaders may gain from signaling their preferences – whether honestly or dishonestly – to improve bargaining outcomes. Existing signaling models can be adapted to refine theory and look for significant empirical implications.
ADDENDUM: TWO-PLAYER CONFLICT BARGAINING GAMES WITH DIFFERENT LEADERSHIP PREFERENCES

The baseline model is a simple, one-period bargaining game. Suppose a state government and a domestic ethnic group bargain over territory and other related collective goods. The total interests at stake are normalized to one. The status quo is written as $\{SQ\} = (q, 1 - q)$, with $q (0 \leq q \leq 1)$ representing the share of player 1. The bargaining starts with player 1’s demand $(x, 1 - x)$, where $x \in [0, 1]$. Player 1’s demand initiates a crisis, which has costs $c_i > 0$ for player $i$. Upon receiving 1’s offer, player 2 can either accept it or reject it. If the demand is accepted, the bargaining is over and $(x, 1 - x)$ becomes the new status quo. If the demand is rejected, the bargaining ends with conflict, denoted by $\{C\}$. The outcome of conflict can be understood as a costly lottery with two possible outcomes: the victory of player 1 (player 1 wins all the benefits in dispute), occurring with probability $p (0 \leq p \leq 1)$; and the victory of player 2 with probability $1 - p$. In addition, conflict has costs $k_i (0 < c_i < k_i < 1)$ for player $i$. To sum up, once begun by the challenger, the bargaining game has two possible outcomes. It either ends in agreement $(x, 1 - x)$ or conflict $\{C\}$. Finally, we assume this bargaining game is played with complete information, that is, all of the above parameters as well as the preferences of players (specified below) are public knowledge.

Ordinary Nationalist Preferences

An ordinary nationalist’s utility payoff to an agreement $(x, 1 - x)$ is $u_n^1(x) = x - c_1$ and $u_n^2(x) = 1 - x - c_2$, where $c_1$ and $c_2$ are the bargaining costs relative to the value of the disputed collective goods. Note that the superscript marks the bargainer’s type – $n$ refers to the ordinary nationalist type. The subscript distinguishes between the two players (1 or 2). Since the outcome of conflict $\{C\}$ is defined as a costly lottery, the expected utility of conflict is $p - k_1$ for the challenger and $1 - p - k_2$ for the defender. Therefore, the payoffs to conflict are $u_n^1(\{C\}) = p - k_1 - c_1$ and $u_n^2(\{C\}) = 1 - p - k_2 - c_2$. Proposition 1 describes when and how the status quo can be revised in a bargaining game involving two ordinary nationalist players.

**Proposition 1.** Under complete information the ordinary–ordinary nationalist bargaining scenario has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in which the status quo can be revised if and only if $p + k_2 \geq q + c_1$. In particular, player 1 proposes $(p + k_2, 1 - p - k_2)$, which is accepted by player 2, and the status quo is revised from $(q, 1 - q)$ to $(p + k_2, 1 - p - k_2)$.

Proof of Proposition 1. The proof has two parts. First we show that, if 1 is motivated to make an offer, this offer will be acceptable to 2. To see why, suppose there exists such an offer $x$. Facing $x$, player 2 has to select between $1 - x$ and $1 - p - k_2$. A
Whenever \( 1 - x \geq 1 - p - k_2 \) or \( x \leq p + k_2 \), \( I \) has every incentive to increase \( x \). However, any \( x > p + k_2 \) will be rejected by \( 2 \) and lead to conflict. Therefore, the best agreement that \( I \) can expect is \( (p + k_2, 1 - p - k_2) \). Note that \( I \) always prefers such an agreement over conflict because \( p + k_2 > p - k_1 \).

Second, let us check whether \( I \) is motivated to make an offer \( x \). Since \( I \)'s best payoff is \( p + k_2 \), \( I \) is motivated to start the crisis whenever \( p + k_2 - c_1 \geq q \Rightarrow p + k_2 \geq q + c_1 \).

**Extreme Nationalist Preferences**

A more extreme nationalist is defined as more highly valuing the upside risks of crisis-induced concessions and victory relative to the downside risk of defeat and the crisis and conflict costs. Thus, an extremist challenger's utility function for agreement \( (x, 1-x) \) is defined as \( u_1^e(x, 1-x) = Ex - c_1 \), where \( E > 1 \) is the extremist index for any agreement that improves upon the status quo. In the event of conflict \( \{C\} \), an extremist places high relative value on the prospect of victory. Therefore, player \( I \)'s expected utility of the costly lottery is \( pE^* - k_1 \), where \( E^* > 1 \) is the extremist index for conflict. Accordingly, \( I \)'s utility function for bargaining that ends in conflict is \( u_1^e(\{C\}) = E^*p - k_1 - c_1 \). For an extremist, we are interested in identifying threshold values of the extremist indices \((E \text{ and } E^*)\) that suffice to forestall the outcomes other than conflict. In Proposition 2, we demonstrate that when an extremist evaluates the benefits and costs too disproportionately, there can be no agreement between an extreme nationalist and an ordinary nationalist.

**Proposition 2.** With complete information, the SPE of extremist-ordinary nationalist bargaining can be either agreement or conflict:

(a) when \( 1) E^* \leq (1/p)(p + k_2)E + (k_1/p) \) and \( 2) E \geq (q + c_1 - k_2)/p \), the status quo will be revised to \((p + k_2, 1 - p - k_2)\). In particular, player \( I \) offers \( x = p + k_2 \), which will be accepted immediately by player \( 2 \);

(b) when \( 1) E^* > (1/p)(p + k_2)E + (k_1/p) \) and \( 2) E \geq (q - c_1 - k_1)/p \), the crisis will end in conflict. In particular, player \( I \) would offer \( x > p + k_2 \), which will be rejected by player \( 2 \).

Proof of Proposition 2. For conflict to be the outcome, the following conditions have to be met. First, \( I \) prefers conflict to the best agreement she can get. From Proposition 1, we know that \( I \)'s best offer acceptable to \( 2 \) is \( x^* = p + k_2 \). Therefore, the first condition requires \( U_1^e(p + k_2, 1 - p - k_2) < U_1^e(\{C\}) \Rightarrow Ex^* - c_1 < E^*p - k_1 - c_1 \Rightarrow E > (1/p)(p + k_2)E + (k_1/p) \). Second, the motivation condition is \( U_1^e(\{C\}) \geq U_1^e(\{SQ\}) \Rightarrow E^*p - k_1 - c_1 \geq q \Rightarrow E^* \geq (q + k_1 + c_1)/p \).

On the other hand, if \( E^* < (1/p)(p + k_2)E + (k_1/p) \), then \( I \) prefers agreement over conflict. In this case, the motivation condition is \( U_1^e(x^*, 1 - x^*) \geq U_1^e(\{SQ\}) \Rightarrow Ep + k_2 - c_1 \geq q \Rightarrow E \geq (q + c_1 - k_2)/p \).
Power-Seeking Preferences

An ideal power-seeking (or diversionary) leader is exclusively concerned about the political consequences of crisis for staying in power. Let us define such a power-seeking player 1’s payoff to the status quo as \( \hat{q} \), to a bargaining agreement \( x \) as \( \hat{x} \). Furthermore, this power-seeker expects some political net benefit \( \hat{b} \) from the process of crisis, where \( \hat{b} \) may be either greater than or less than 0. Therefore, player 1’s utility function for agreements \( (x, 1-x) \) is \( U^d_i(x, 1-x) = \hat{x} + \hat{b} \). Note that \( \hat{q} \) and \( \hat{x} \) capture 1’s perception of political consequences of various redistributions of the collective goods. In a strict sense, if there exists a function between an agreement \( x \) and its political consequences \( \hat{x} \), or \( \hat{x} = f(x) \), the only restriction of \( f \) is that \( f \) must be an increasing function. For the sake of clarity, we consider the simple form \( f(x) = \beta x \) and \( \beta > 1 \). In the event of conflict \( (C) \), a power-seeker can expect political benefits \( \hat{w} \) from victory, political costs from defeat \( \hat{l} \) and political costs/benefits from the conflict itself \( \hat{k} \) (\( \hat{k} \) may be either greater or less than 0). The payoff to the lottery is written as \( \hat{\sigma}^d_i = p\hat{w} + (1+p)\hat{l} + \hat{k} \). Accordingly, the power-seeker’s utility function is \( U^d_i(C) = \hat{\sigma}^d_i + \hat{b} \). Proposition 3 sets out the possible outcomes of bargaining between a power-seeker and an ordinary nationalist.

**Proposition 3.** With complete information, the SPE of the power-seeker–ordinary nationalist bargaining can be either conflict or agreement:

(a) when \( \hat{\sigma}^d_i \leq \beta(p + k_2) \) and \( \hat{q} \leq \beta(p + k_2) + \hat{b} \), the status quo will be revised to \( (p + k_2, 1-p - k_2) \). In particular, player 1 offers \( x = p + k_2 \), which will be accepted immediately by player 2;

(b) when \( \hat{\sigma}^d_1 > \beta(p + k_2) \) and \( \hat{q} \leq \hat{\sigma}^d_1 + \hat{b} \), the crisis will end in conflict. In particular, player 1 would offer \( x > p + k_2 \), which will be rejected by player 2.

Proof of Proposition 3. First, for an agreement \( (x, 1-x) \) to be made, we need \( U^d_i(p + k_2, 1 - p - k_2) \geq U^d_i(C) \) \( \Rightarrow \hat{\sigma}^d_i \leq \beta(p + k_2) \). Then the motivation condition requires \( U^d_i(p + k_2, 1 - p - k_2) \geq U^d_i(C) \) \( \Rightarrow \hat{q} \leq \beta(p + k_2) + \hat{b} \).

Second, for conflict to be the outcome, we need \( U^d_i(p + k_2, 1 - p - k_2) < U^d_i(C) \) \( \Rightarrow \hat{\sigma}^d_i > \beta(p + k_2) \). Then the motivation condition requires \( U^d_i(C) \geq U^d_i(SQ) \) \( \Rightarrow \hat{q} \leq \hat{\sigma}^d_i + \hat{b} \).}

NOTES

1. There are many variations on this basic pattern of ethnic conflict over rival homeland claims. Sometimes there is more than one politically dominant ethnic group, sometimes the largest ethnic group does not control the state, sometimes conflicts occur between sub-national ethnic groups, and so on.


4. Decisions in conflicts are usually made by leaders. Both structural and institutional constraints must work through leaders with various preferences. Studies on individual decision-making have demonstrated that the same material conditions may have varying ramifications for different leaders.


7. Bargaining models of war onset also account for war duration — in the sense that a war that does not break out has zero duration. Thus, if a war has already broken out, the same model can be used to explain whether or not a war ends or continues under the prevailing conditions. See Robert Powell, ‘Bargaining and Learning While Fighting’, *American Journal of Political Science* 48/2 (2004) pp.344–61. Similarly, avoiding war or ending war involves explaining the outcome chosen instead of war. Thus, if war has already broken out, explaining why it ends at a certain time also explains the outcome when it ends. See Harrison Wagner, ‘Bargaining and War’, *American Journal of Political Science* 44/3 (2000) pp.469–84. The basic version of the model discussed here assumes that there is only one way of fighting the war — one war strategy. If this assumption is dropped and two or more war strategies are allowed for each side, then the framework can also predict choice of war strategies.


9. For example, concessions necessary to prevent war might themselves cause changes in the balance of power, which in the absence of credible commitments to the status quo would then lead to new crises; or there might be uncertainty about the true balance of power, leading one or both sides to believe that war will deliver greater gains than the other side is willing to accept in a bargain short of war.

10. Note that such a significant change in the status quo is typically due to significant changes in relative power or in leadership preferences, and thus would be considered an effect rather than a cause of crisis.

11. Although continuous measures would be theoretically ideal, we were not able to distinguish more than five intervals along the nationalist goals dimension and three intervals along the principled–unprincipled dimension.


13. Montenegro is excluded from the analysis, because Montenegrins are not ethnically distinct from Serbs. There was a potential conflict here, but it involved regional rather than ethnic separatism.
To analyze this case, it would be necessary to adapt the analysis and the template. For space reasons, we also do not consider the much smaller ethnic minorities, such as the Sandžak Muslims and the Vojvodina Hungarians and Croats.

14. See the Appendix for sources.

15. As noted in the Appendix, Milošević sometimes appeared to moderate his nationalism, speaking and acting more like an ordinary nationalist.

16. Milošević defined his nationalist goals in terms of restoring Serbia’s full internal control over the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina and pursuing self-determination for the concentrated Serb communities in Croatia and Bosnia. Milošević’s nationalist goals did not involve Slovenia or Macedonia. For Tudjman, independence within Croatia’s Yugoslav boundaries was the primary objective, while self-determination of the Bosnian Croats was a secondary objective. For Izetbegović, the preference is the same vis-à-vis Serbia and Croatia, given his strong commitment to a unified Bosnia as the future religious-nationalist homeland of the Bosnian Muslims. Gligorov’s cautious, moderate nationalism applied to both Serbia and the Macedonian Albanians. For more details, see the Appendix.

17. This might not be so in all institutional and practical settings. In Slovenia, Peterle as the prime minister had more power, and could not have been easily constrained by Kučan in the event of a serious disagreement. For the Macedonian Albanians in 1994–1995, Halili and Xhaferi led separate, large and well-organized parties. So either could have acted independently of the other. We classify the leaders of the Croatian Serbs and Bosnian Serbs as dependent on Milošević, and those of the Bosnian Croats as dependent on Tudjman. As discussed in the Appendix, Milošević wanted the appearance of Croatian and Bosnian Serb independence. But when he wanted to, he did not hesitate to impose new leadership, or to exclude the Croatian and Bosnian Serb leaders from negotiations and decisions about when and on what terms to end the conflict (most notably, in the Dayton Accords). Tudjman openly appointed and replaced Bosnian Croat leaders at his pleasure.

18. The institutions were adopted in the 1974 constitution, but were not fully operative while Tito remained the de facto absolute ruler.

19. Here and elsewhere, we use the term ‘substantially all’ to indicate that no large regions claimed as parts of homelands were outside federal territorial limits. In all cases, there are small communities near borders that might ideally be added to federal territories.


21. The 1–5 range of variation used here is sample-specific. Larger or different samples would typically require greater variation on one or both ends of the range. Developing such a scale is beyond the scope of this paper.

22. For example, for the dyads Croatia–Bosnian Muslims and Serbia–Bosnian Muslims, the economic strength of the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs are deducted from the figure for Bosnia as a whole and added to the respective figures for Croatia and Serbia. At the same time, the Croatia figure excludes Croatian Serbs and the Serbia figure excludes Kosovo Albanians. Where separate statistics for ethnic minorities are not available – as with Croatian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Macedonian Albanians – we estimate that their per capita incomes were the same as the republic average. We do not use the well-known Correlates of War measure of material capabilities, which has missing data and also seems to have significant measurement errors for these cases. For example, Slovenia is estimated to have about one-fifth the capabilities of Serbia – a gross underestimate largely due to excluding sizeable paramilitary (reserve and police) forces from estimates of military manpower and spending.


24. War broke out in Kosovo in 1998, as did crisis (but not war) in Macedonia in 1999. This later time period is beyond the scope of this paper.

25. Information about preferences and possibly other factors is necessary to make such predictions.
26. If the political benefits are not significant, a strong power-seeker can be expected to avoid the significant potential downside political risks of war. Significant diversionary political benefits may be captured by using harsh public rhetoric, and by initiating a crisis while stopping short of war.

27. In 1991, after Slovenia’s unilaterally declared independence, Milošević stopped a nascent conflict between Slovenia and the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA), preferring to let Slovenia leave the Federation in order to gain control over the rump Yugoslav state and the YPA.


29. The implication is that, other things equal, a power-seeker always gains more politically from a better deal, or \( \hat{x} > \hat{y} \Leftrightarrow x > y \).
Nationalist and Power-Seeking Leadership Preferences in Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: A Measurement Framework with Applications to the Break-Up of Yugoslavia

Shale Horowitz and Min Ye


Appendix: Ideal-Types and Templates for Leadership Preferences

Note: This Appendix is intended for on-line publication, as a supplement to the main article.

Below we provide the seven filled-in templates for the seven executive leaderships involved in the 14 potential conflict initiations examined in the former Yugoslavia in 1990-1995. At the bottom of each template, there is a classification of leadership preferences on a five-point scale on the non-nationalist-to-extreme-nationalist dimension, and on a three-point scale on the principled-to-unprincipled dimension. Ideal-types for points along each scale are described below. Construction of such ordinal scales is only one way of summarizing the variation in the templates. Other approaches may be reasonable.

Recall that information on the dependent variable or variables of interest may not be used to code leadership preferences. There are two ways to exclude such information. First, it is possible to exclude all information classified in the templates under the second heading: “Actions indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time-period examined.” Second, it is possible to exclude only the information related to the particular dependent variable or variables of interest. In this paper, the outcome of interest is war onset. In the templates, we have italicized this information within each cell containing information about actions. The pros and cons of each approach are discussed in the article. Here we did not use the italicized information about war onset actions in making the preference classifications. We also note that there was no example in which the information
about actions other than war onset changed preference classifications from what they would have been in the absence of such information. In other words, information about actions other than war onset was consistent with the other information in the templates. But this does not allow us to conclude that gathering information about actions is superfluous in general.

In gathering information for the templates, we used two main source types: periodicals and scholarly secondary works. Each one has its comparative strengths. Periodicals offer more detailed coverage, particularly in accumulating information consistently across long time-spans. Secondary works are more focused on explaining outcomes such as war onset, and therefore are more likely to gather diverse types of information into coherent analytical narratives. Analytical blind spots of particular secondary works are best remedied by consulting other secondary works. We found that the two types of source complemented one another in gathering the full range of information called for by the templates.

Five Ideal-Typical Categories for Nationalist Preferences Dimension

1) Non-nationalist:
   a) Statements and actions directly indicating preferences: In official statements and actions, there is no significant interest in collective political goals. For the outsider group, these would be independence, or institutional and cultural autonomy; and for the dominant group or groups, expulsion or assimilation of the outsider group. Goals pursued and methods used are similar for political organizations representing both dominant and outsider ethnic groups.
   b) Emphasis on collective goals and treatment of other ethnic groups: Normatively, pursuit of collective goals of both dominant and outsider groups are discouraged. There is no significant
effort to elicit support for collective goals from either own or other groups. Individual rights of the ethnic other are strictly respected.

c) War outcomes: During violent conflict, ethnic cleansing of out-groups is extremely unlikely to be initiated or reciprocated, even if it is feasible and likely to advance important goals. Systematic terrorism and mass killings of out-group civilians are extremely unlikely.

d) Political organization: Within dominant political organization leaderships, collective goals are either ignored or discouraged.

2) Moderate nationalist:

a) Statements and actions directly indicating preferences: In official statements and actions, independence or assimilation goals may exist theoretically. Maximal and intermediate collective goals are valued. But there is a dominant emphasis on coexistence and improvement under existing conditions, while avoiding significant political confrontations and economic disruptions. Political pressure may be used to bargain for institutional and policy changes within the existing political system, but there is little or no use of violence or even extra-political activities such as protests and strikes. War would not be threatened, initiated, or continued except to achieve the highest collective goals—such as independence—and even then only if success was viewed as highly likely.

b) Emphasis on collective goals and treatment of other ethnic groups: Normatively, collective goals of own group are prioritized; but there is also tolerance of collective goals of other groups. Efforts to elicit civilian support for collective goals do not involve violence or even extraordinary political tactics, but are limited to ordinary politics.
c) *War outcomes:* During violent conflict, ethnic cleansing of out-groups is extremely unlikely to be initiated, and unlikely to be reciprocated, even when it is feasible and likely to advance important goals. Systematic terrorism and mass killings of out-group civilians are extremely unlikely.

d) *Political organization:* Within dominant political organization leaderships, moderate nationalist views are encouraged but not enforced.

3) Ordinary nationalist:

a) *Statements and actions directly indicating preferences:* In official statements and actions, there is an active interest and policy agenda aimed at independence or state-sponsored assimilation, as well as other collective goals such as territorial autonomy and cultural policies. Both maximal and intermediate goals are highly valued, so that compromise is acceptable if the costs of pursuing maximal goals are much higher. In threatening, initiating, or wanting to persist with war, either a strong probability of success, or a significant probability of success at relatively low cost, would be necessary.

b) *Emphasis on collective goals and treatment of other ethnic groups:* Normatively, collective goals of own group are prioritized; and collective goals of other groups are discouraged, but individual rights of other-group members are defended. Efforts to elicit civilian support for collective goals do not involve violence, but may involve extraordinary political tactics.

c) *War outcomes:* During violent conflict, ethnic cleansing of out-groups is unlikely to be initiated, but may be reciprocated, where it is feasible and likely to advance important goals. Systematic terrorism and mass killings of out-group civilians are extremely unlikely.
d) Political organization: Within dominant political organization leaderships, ordinary nationalist views are encouraged but not enforced.

4) Strong nationalist:

a) Statements and actions directly indicating preferences: In official statements and actions, there is an active interest and policy agenda aimed at independence or state-sponsored assimilation, as well as other collective goals. The value of intermediate goals is discounted relative to the maximal goals, such as independence on all contested homeland territory. But lesser goals are sufficiently valued so as to make compromise possible. In threatening, initiating, and wanting to persist with war, high costs are acceptable if there is a significant chance of victory, but not if there is little prospect of success.

b) Emphasis on collective goals and treatment of other ethnic groups: Normatively, collective goals of own group are strongly prioritized; collective goals of other groups are strongly discouraged; individual rights of other-group members would ordinarily be accepted, but in practice are likely to be restricted where they are viewed as threatening own-group collective goals. Efforts to elicit civilian support for collective goals may involve violence; but violence is likely to be targeted primarily at organized political institutions and groups and military formations of the rival group. Actions aimed at individuals and civil society organizations are unlikely to go beyond extraordinary political tactics; but there may be some informal tolerance or even support for violence against out-groups.

c) War outcomes: During violent conflicts, formal or informal ethnic cleansing may be initiated, and is highly likely to be reciprocated against out-groups, where it is feasible and likely to
advances important goals; systematic terrorism and mass killings of out-group civilians are unlikely.

d) Political organization: Within dominant political organization leaderships, strong nationalist views are a prerequisite for high positions. Internal democracy is possible, but is likely to be restricted if it threatens incumbent leadership goals.

5) Extreme nationalist:

a) Statements and actions directly indicating preferences: In official statements and actions, there is an active interest and policy agenda aimed at independence or state-sponsored assimilation or expulsion, as well as other collective goals. The value of intermediate goals is heavily discounted relative to the maximal goals (such as independence on all contested homeland territory). In threatening, initiating, and wanting to persist in war, there is a will to pursue maximal goals at almost any cost with little short-term prospect of success.

b) Emphasis on collective goals and treatment of other ethnic groups: Normatively, collective goals of own group are strongly prioritized; collective goals of other groups are totally excluded; individual rights of other-group members are likely to be restricted in principle as threatening to own-group collective goals. Violence is likely to be targeted not only at organized political institutions and groups and military formations of the rival group, but also against own-group organized political institutions and against individuals and civil society organizations of both groups.

c) War outcomes: During violent conflicts, formal or informal ethnic cleansing is very likely to be initiated as well as reciprocated against out-groups, where it is feasible. Systematic terrorism against out-groups is likely, and mass killings also may be conducted.
d) **Political organization:** Within dominant political organization leaderships, extreme nationalist views are strictly enforced for all positions. Internal democracy is extremely unlikely.

**Three Ideal-Typical Categories for Principled-Unprincipled (Power-Seeking) Dimension**

1) Strongly principled:

   a) *Apparent commitment to principle:* An ideologue. Near-absolute commitment to one or more political goals. Uncommon in professional politicians.

   b) *Riskiness and consistency of behavior:* Expect frequent evidence of will to risk power or personal safety in pursuit of core goals. Expect near-absolute consistency in pursuit of core goals and priorities, as well as near-absolute consistency of strategies with stated core goals and priorities.

   c) *Political organization:* Within own organization, strong emphasis on recruitment of other purely principled leaders, including those of independent political stature.

   d) *Corruption:* No personal corruption expected; client corruption strongly discouraged. Client corruption acceptable only if viewed as a necessary evil in service of substantive political goals.

2) Balanced:

   a) *Apparent commitment to principle:* A typical career politician. Significantly committed to one or more particularly substantive political goals. But willing to trade off many supposedly core political goals for a large enough political advantage.

   b) *Riskiness and consistency of behavior:* Expected to avoid risks to power or personal safety except when core priorities are significantly concerned. Expect moderate consistency in pursuit
of core goals and priorities, as well as moderate consistency of strategies with stated core goals and priorities.

c) **Political organization:** Within own organization, strong emphasis on recruitment of leaders that are both principled and effective, including those of independent political stature.

d) **Corruption:** Little personal corruption expected. Client corruption acceptable if viewed as serving substantive political goals and power goals.

3) Strongly Unprincipled or Power-seeking:

a) **Apparent commitment to principle:** An opportunist. No convincing commitment to any substantive political goals. Willing to sacrifice all supposedly core political goals for a significant political advantage.

b) **Riskiness and consistency of behavior:** Expect no evidence of will to risk power or personal safety in pursuit of goals. Expect pronounced inconsistency in pursuit of core goals and priorities, as well as pronounced inconsistency of strategies with stated core goals and priorities—where inconsistency delivers short-term political advantage.

c) **Political organization:** Within own organization, emphasis on top-down loyalty at the expense of political effectiveness. Desire to maintain top-down control of organization leads to predominance of “yes-men,” which tend to be drawn heavily from relatives and personal networks.

d) **Corruption:** Personal corruption common except where it threatens power. Client corruption a primary mechanism of serving power goals.
Leadership Templates for Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts

Table A1. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Croatia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Moderate vs. Extreme Nationalist Dimension:</th>
</tr>
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| 1) Statements indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs. | In 1989, principal founder of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the main center-right party that prioritized nationalist goals (independence) more than economic and political reforms of the Yugoslav system. Pursued independence peacefully, but ultimately with a stated will to initiate use of force to seize and defend it. This demand was initially couched, jointly with Slovenian leaders, in terms of transforming Yugoslavia into a confederation of sovereign states. Prior to declaring independence, Tudjman was more cautious than Slovenian leaders in unilaterally moving towards statehood; nevertheless, he declared in advance that, failing an agreement by June 1991, Croatia would declare independence (Andrejevich, 2 November 1990, 30-1; Andrejevich, 22 February 1991, 37; Andrejevich, 15 March 1991, 27-8). Use of force to achieve independence feasible but not easy, given collapse of all-Yugoslav institutions and high Croatian state capacity on one hand, but large internal, border-concentrated Serb minority and determined support from Serbia proper and Bosnian Serbs. Support for cultural but not political autonomy for Croatian Serbs (Andrejevich, 4 May 1990, 37; Andrejevich, 14 September 1990, 41; Moore, 11 September 1991, 37). Croatian Serb Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) leader Rasković: Tudjman “...represents what most Croats accept....’ He opined that Tudjman was ‘Croato-centric,’ but no Ustasha. His real hatred was reserved for the communists...” (Andrejevich, 14 September 1990, 41-2; Tanner 2001, 224). Yet Tudjman praised Tito for keeping Yugoslavia independent (Silber and Little 1996, 86). Before and after coming to power in April 1990 elections, Tudjman presided over an ideologically broad party, in which he effectively maintained a pivotal, dominating authority position (Goldstein 1999, 211-2; Tanner 2001, 230), “Tudjman’s HDZ was a broad church, more a movement than a party, of moderate and extreme nationalists. Tudjman spanned both wings” (Silber and Little 1996, 96; also Goldstein 1999, 212). “Tudjman considered it was his historic mission to create an independent Croatian state and he found compromise on this issue extremely difficult” (Goldstein 1999, 215). Although condemned Ustashe as “fascist...
criminals,” argued that fascist state advanced legitimate goal of Croatian statehood, and reportedly said, “Thank God my wife is not a Jew or a Serb” (Silber and Little 1996, 86). New constitution removed official recognition of Serbs as a “co-official” nationality, made widespread nationalist changes in symbols and names, maintained politicization of state media, and purged many Serbs from police and civil service. In meeting with Rasković, offered to consider Serb autonomy proposals, but did little in practice to reassure Serbs (Moore, 6 September 1991, 33). “One must ask whether the Croatian authorities could have prevented the Serb insurrection and the war if they had followed a more considered policy: probably they could not have done so….However, fewer of them could have joined the other side if Croatian policy had been more intelligent, and the overall damage would have been less” (Goldstein 1999, 216-7). Tudjman tried to get Rasković to enter his government. Rasković demanded equal titular status of Serbs with Croats within Croatia, rather than a specific autonomous region (Silber and Little 1996, 96). After clandestine rearming, Tudjman resisted Defense Minister Spegelj’s proposal to attack Croatian Serb de facto statelets preemptively. After June 1991 declaration of independence, during brief fighting in Slovenia, again rejected Spegelj’s plan to launch a preemptive enirclement of JNA bases in Croatia, on grounds that it would be “political suicide for democratic Croatia,” largely because of expected international condemnation (Silber and Little 1996, 109). Repeatedly emphasized need to cultivate international support, which could be mobilized to counteract Serbia’s initial political and military advantage (Gow, 15 May 1992, 17; Moore, 6 September 1991, 32; Moore, 11 September 1991, 38; Moore, 20 December 1991, 34). Before Bosnia war, may have sought to append Croat-controlled regions of Bosnia to Croatia, for example in meetings with Milošević (Andrejevich, 12 April 1991, 29-30). But also stated that Bosnia’s borders would remain unchanged (Andrejevich, 28 June 1991, 36); and at times supported the concept of cantonizing Bosnia while maintaining its external borders (Bićanić and Dominis, 18 September 1992, 25). Responding to Milošević’s argument that Serbia would seek to absorb large Serb populations outside Serbia in the event of Yugoslavia’s break-up, Tudjman sought to deter him with a reciprocal claim, which potentially applied to parts of Vojvodina as well as to parts of Bosnia: “By the same token, we Croats have a right to
demand that all Croats live in the same state” (Andrejevich, 15 March 1991, 28). Aspired to maximum control over Bosnian Croat regions, but also did not adopt an uncompromising position, especially on territorial sovereignty, as he did toward Croatia proper. (For general discussions, see Burg and Shoup 1999, 102-4; Goldstein 1999, 204-6, 210-22; Silber and Little 1996, 82-91, 105-17; Tanner 2001, 221-60.)

| 2) **Actions** indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment. | **Unilaterally declared and seized independence in June 1991, predictably triggering Serbian invasion to support Croatian Serbs** (Andrejevich, Moore and Perry, 12 July 1991; Andrejevich, 16 August 1991). Agreed to cease-fire in November 1991, signed January 1992, that left large parts of Croatia in Croatian Serb hands. Tudjman’s opponents in the August 1992 presidential election all criticized this concession. Tudjman’s decision was a recognition of the need for time to build strength, rather than a commitment to accept the outcome, but it might have been indefinite (Bićanić and Dominis, 18 September 1992, 23-4). Although Croatian Serbs and Serbian paramilitaries initiated use of terror and ethnic cleansing and conducted it on a larger scale, persistent local pressure and violence cleansed Croatian Serbs from Croatian Army-controlled zones of fighting. Orthodox churches were often destroyed. There was little evidence of central government effort to protect Croatian Serb civilians. Opposition media in Croatia were harassed, but no violence was used against Croat civilians. Democratic process in Croatia was preserved. Commitment to internal democracy qualified by some harassment of opposition, backtracking on democratic norms (Sućić, 7 February 1997, 35-7). But no violence against Croatian political opponents. Force used only to dismantle unofficial HOS militia of Paraga (Gow, 15 May 1992, 19; Tanner 2001, 261-7). Sought to append Croat-controlled regions of Bosnia to Croatia. In Bosnia, initial cooperation between Tudjman and Izetbegović was formalized in July 1992. November 1991 declaration of separate Herceg-Bosna signaled ascendance of interests of regionally dominant Herzegovina Croats over the dispersed Croat communities of Central Bosnia. During fighting with Bosnian Muslims in 1993-94, both sides engaged in ethnic cleansing to solidify control of contested territories—though the conflict and cleansing process was initiated by the Muslims’ central Bosnia offensive in early 1993 (Moore, 13 August 1993, 20; Shrader 2003, 70-162). Occasional killings of civilians also occurred (Moore, 7 |
January 1994; Shrader 2003). International pressure (sanction threats) led Tudjman to agree to joint Federation with Bosnian Muslims in exchange for diplomatic and military support from U.S. (February 1994 Washington Agreement). This showed Tudjman making Croatia’s territorial integrity and international standing a higher priority than the goals of the Herzegovina Croats (Moore, 28 May 1993; Moore, 1 April 1994; Moore, 30 January 1995, 26-7). Tudjman showed a general though grudging willingness to compromise, except on issues—such as independence—deemed fundamental and attainable. “Z4 Plan” to exchange Croatian Serb autonomy for Croatian sovereignty accepted by Milosević and with reservations by Tudjman, but rejected by Croatian Serbs (Tanner 2001, 282-95). As military tide turned and Croatian Serbs started to cave in diplomatically, Tudjman rushed the final offensive that quickly overran the Croatian Serb zones (except for eastern Slavonia). Although Tudjman proclaimed that the Croatian Serb population could stay, there was never any question of this. After they fled the military assault, their villages were widely looted and burned. The Dayton Agreement was an outright victory on all of Croatia’s territory, and a de facto victory in Bosnia. Nevertheless, the absence of de jure Bosnian Croat autonomy represented a real and lasting concession. (For general discussions, see Burg and Shoup 1999, 292-8; Goldstein 1999, 239-74.)

3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning other political goals or in personal life.

Other priorities, such as political and personal freedoms, and economic reforms, were viewed more pragmatically rather than ideologically, and sometimes compromised to serve nationalist goals. For example, macroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic market reforms were delayed to finance the war effort, but remained a priority for Tudjman (Bićanić, 12 November 1993, 38; Bićanić, 21 January 1994, 41-2).

4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.

Tudjman showed a tendency to make strong (if not extreme) ideological commitments throughout life—initially to Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA). Fought as a partisan, became a YPA general at 38, and gravitated to ideological work. “He was ambitious and hard-working, and his historical texts were primarily those of a politician who wanted to adapt the interpretation of history to suit his political goals.” Fired during suppression of Croatian Spring, he developed “a kind of Croatian national programme” (Andrejevich, 23 February 1990, 28-9; Goldstein 1999, 204-6, 303-4).
5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations. | The HDZ included all types from far-right to center, with Tudjman functioning as the unifying force. Some of these leaders later became political rivals, though mainly after leaving the HDZ out of frustration. Significant if not total commitment to internal party democracy and statewide democracy helped generate many leaders with broadly similar preferences. Tudjman always sought to preserve an ideologically broad party—preventing either the right-wing or the left-wing from becoming dominant (Moore, 22 April 1994; Moore, 3 June 1994).

**Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:**

1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict. | Fought as a partisan and rose to rank of general before joining Croatian Spring nationalist movement. Thereafter remained solidly committed to the nationalist cause. Croatian Serb SDS leader Rasković “accused the HDZ of harboring Ustashe sympathizers, but admired Tudjman personally as an honest politician. ‘He is a tough politician of clear conceptions who represents what most Croats accept. Tudjman is the kind of character who speaks quite openly about his intentions, and we like that…” (Tanner 2001, 224) Had a reputation for political openness and consistency (Tanner 2001, 293; Silber and Little 1996, 83-4).

2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict. | Fought as a partisan during World War II. For dissident activity, sentenced to two years (served one) in prison during Croatian Spring, and again for three years in 1981. From 1989, was willing to risk confrontation and either arrest or war; risk to personal position and freedom greater than risk to life. Did not seek to create an authoritarian regime; left a party that ceded power after losing elections, and later returned to power in elections. (For summaries, see Andrejevich, 23 February 1990, 28-9; Goldstein 1999, 204-6; Tanner 2001, 201, 205).

3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict. | Fought as a partisan during World War II. Gravitated to ideological activity his whole adult life, first in YPA and later as a nationalist dissident. Significant corruption among HDZ elites used to solidify party control and personal influence. But a more pronounced bias was toward maintaining state control of many large enterprises, which preserved political patronage in the hands of the government (Bićanić, 25 June 1993; Bićanić, 12 November 1993, 32). No evidence of personal corruption, but some nepotism.

4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders. | Many leaders of both types active in HDZ. A number of prominent HDZ members became critical of Tudjman and defected to join or form other parties (Moore, 22 April
Categorization: strongly principled (1), strong nationalist (4) in the Serbia dyad; but an ordinary nationalist (3) vis-à-vis Bosnia, with the Bosnian Croat regions a lower priority both in statements and actions.

Rationale: Evidence on ideological commitment to nationalist cause uniform and strong. Stated will to go to war for independence, with high costs but also high probability of success to be expected. Careful to plan onset and conduct of war in manner that didn’t jeopardize objectives. On one hand, before war, failed to reassure Croatian Serbs about their future status, and refused any significant autonomy or official status compromise with Croatian Serbs. On other hand, agreed to cease-fire leaving large Croatian territories in Serb hands in late 1991; and compromised in setting up Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation to avoid sanctions and gain support for restoring control over all of Croatia’s territory. Clearly not an extreme nationalist (5). Failure to consider more significant compromises before or during war indicates that he was more than an ordinary nationalist (3) vis-à-vis Serbia and the Croatian Serbs. Showed much more flexibility and will to compromise over Bosnian Croat regions. Consistent with this, he sought to maintain strong internal control of HDZ and imposed only limited restrictions on opposition press freedoms and opposition political power, while presiding over a catch-all party encompassing many political notables (including potential rivals) amid a well-functioning democratic political system.

Table A2. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Bosnian Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Executive Leadership: Alija Izetbegović</th>
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| 1) Statements indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs. | Committed to long-term goal of making Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) the titular nation-state of Bosnian Muslims, including a vague political role for Islam (Andrejevich, 7 December 1990, 23-4). In short-run, acknowledged that this is not possible until Muslims constitute either 50% of the population (Islamic Declaration), or 70% of the population (Silber and Little 1996, 208). At same time, agreed with secular-nationalist faction that Bosnia should retain all of its territory and be administered as a centralized state. Embraced religious-nationalist identity, rather than secular-nationalist Muslim identity or pan-ethnic territorial-cultural identity. According to Mahmutčehajić, Izetbegović’s statements in the Islamic Declaration about how Islam could not peacefully coexist with non-Islamic institutions, and his rejection of state secularism, “robbed of legitimacy” those Muslims advocating multi-ethnic Bosniak identity. “When this statement of Izetbegovic’s is cited in the political arena, Bosniak policy—reasonably enough—cannot but appear to be a danger threatening all” (Mahmutčehajić 2000, 43-4). In advance of war, Izetbegović stated repeatedly that war would be preferable to remaining within Serbia-dominated rump Yugoslavia, even if “submission” would be for “15
years” (Burg and Shoup 1999, 77); but at same time he minimized the likely cost, despite a highly adverse balance of power, given minority status with Bosnia, near-certain support of Serbia and Croatia for their ethnic kin, encirclement with no outlet to the sea, and little expectation of active external support. Did not recognize collective goals of Serbs and Croats, but only their individual rights. Although insisted on war if necessary, did not seem to undertake any serious planning or preparation, which seems to have been organized, largely independently, by others. In the 1990 electoral campaign, took a deliberately vague position on Bosnia’s status within Yugoslavia: “The PDA [Party of Democratic Action—primary Bosnian Muslim political party] envisages a federation with many confederal elements or a confederation with many federal elements” (Andrejevich, 18 January 1991, 31). After the election, he adopted the position of Slovenia and Croatia, that Yugoslavia should become a confederation of sovereign states (Andrejevich, 5 July 1991, 29-30). In parliamentary debate before declaring sovereignty, stated that “there will not be war” and “sleep peacefully” (Burg and Shoup 1999, 77, 78), and at the same time, “the Muslims will defend themselves with great determination and survive” (Silber and Little 1996, 215). Izetbegović emphasized multi-ethnic Bosniak identity in contacts with West, but emphasized Muslims as titular people in contacts with Islamic world. In December 1993, Izetbegović spoke out against “common life” of the three ethnicities (quote from Burg and Shoup 1999, 194-7). (For general discussions, see Burg and Shoup 1999, 46-7, 58-60, 66-8, 71-3, 77-8, 105-7, 108-16, 120-7, 194-7; Mahmutčehajić 2000, 43-4; Silber and Little 1996, 27, 211, 213-4, 217, 219.)

2) Actions indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment. Although didn’t initiate fighting, declaration of independence was the key step in precipitating fighting. Insisted on fighting rather than accepting either de jure partition or de facto partition via regional federalization. Once war underway, long tolerated tremendous costs rather than compromise, but ultimately proved willing to compromise at Dayton. He showed a pattern of appearing to compromise and then drawing back, from prewar Cutleiro negotiations through late-war Tudjman-Milosevic negotiations (Andrejevich, 8 October 1993, 17). Did not use violence against Muslim political rivals except where they actively rebelled—as did Fikret Abdić (Andrejevich, 8 October 1993). Did not initiate ethnic cleansing in conflict with Serbia and Serbs, but reciprocated it on a large scale—
mainly by saying and doing nothing while local commanders did it. Risked further disaster by initiating secondary conflict with Croatia for exclusive control of central Bosnia, during which Muslim forces initiated ethnic cleansing of Croats (Moore, 13 August 1993, 20; Shrader 2003, 70-162). Except in some multi-ethnic urban centers such as Sarajevo and Tuzla, ethnic cleansing seems to have been done everywhere where it was feasible. Didn’t use terrorism as a state policy, but again, didn’t actively preempt local commanders from using it except after long delays and negative publicity. Examples were organized criminal-led gangs in Sarajevo (for a year and a half) and foreign militants (Moore, 7 January 1994, 116). (For general discussions, see Burg and Shoup 1999, 66-8, 105-7, 137-9, 171-81, 194-7, 269-81, 317-62; Mahmutčehajić 2000, 46-9, 52-5.)

| 3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning other political goals or in personal life. | Committed to pan-Islamic political unity (Burg and Shoup 1999, 66-8). Emphasis on Muslim religious identity in education and cultural policies (Mahmutčehajić 2000, 87). |
| 4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict. | As young man, during World War II, member of religious-nationalist Muslim Youth. In SFRY, early declaration of support for pan-Islamic state across Muslim world. Such public statements and activities predictably led to his imprisonment (Burg and Shoup 1999, 58-60). |
| 5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations. | Within the ideologically diverse Bosnian Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA), frequently alleged to be “autocratic,” but also regarded as one able to “reconcile the hawks with the doves” (Delo, 20 December 1990, quoted by Andrejevich, 18 January 1991, 31); encouraged leaders that shared his strong religious-nationalist beliefs, but tolerated secular Muslim nationalists and those committed to multi-ethnic Bosniak identity. Examples are Zulfikarpašić and Silajdžić. Those that disagreed too much—e.g., over seeking prewar compromise with Serbs (Zulfikarpašić)—sooner or later ended up leaving the SDA and starting new parties (Andrejevich, 7 December 1990, 24-5; Burg and Shoup 1999, 66-8, 71-3; Cabaravdić, 3 November 1995; Cabaravdić, 12 July 1996; Zulfikarpašić 1998). |

**Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:**

| 1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict. | For many decades, remained committed to long-term goal of Bosnia as titular state of Bosnian Muslims, defined religiously as well as ethnically (Burg and Shoup 1999, 46-7). |
2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict. During World War II, member of Young Muslims nationalist youth movement with ties to Ustashe (Croatian fascist) youth movement, but did not fight in the Ustashe-Partisan war. Was imprisoned in 1946 for Young Muslims membership. Imprisoned again in 1983 for advocating pan-Muslim religious nationalism that directly challenged incumbent Yugoslav system. From 1989, was willing to risk confrontation and either arrest or war; there was a risk to life as well as to personal position and freedom. Briefly seized and imprisoned by Bosnian Serb forces at Sarajevo Airport in May 1992 (Burg and Shoup 1999, 66-8; Andrejevich, 7 December 1990, 23; Andrejevich, 18 January 1991, 31).

3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict. No evidence of personal corruption. Tolerated corruption or criminality among subordinates insofar as this seemed necessary to pursue his goals (Burg and Shoup 1999, 66-8). “Lack of transparency in use of funds,” but apparently in service of religious-nationalist goals (Mahmutčehajić 2000, 87).

4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders. High-profile SDA leaders were generally principled. Sought to promote fellow leaders sharing his ideological beliefs. (Burg and Shoup 1999, 66-8).

Categorization: strongly principled (1), strong nationalist (4), in both the Serbia and Croatia dyads.

Rationale: Far-reaching religious-nationalist identity with titular national and substantively Islamic political goals, combined with repeatedly stated will to risk war under highly adverse conditions indicates at least strong nationalist. Prior to declaring independence, repeatedly stated will to go to war under prevailing circumstances. Treatment of other ethnic groups and own-group political organization indicates not an extreme nationalist. Also corroborated by ultimate willingness to compromise at Dayton. All evidence indicates purely principled. Tolerance of corruption seems intended instrumentally to consolidate and maintain personal political control so as to safeguard pursuit of objectives.

Table A3. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Serbia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Executive Leadership: Slobodan Milošević</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) <strong>Statements</strong> indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed</td>
<td>Initially sought Serbia-centered recentralization of power in Yugoslavia; but also declared that, if Slovenia, Croatia and other Republics seceded, would support secession of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs rather than fight to preserve a unified Yugoslavia (Andrejevich, 20 July 1990, 40; Andrejevich, 14 September 1990, 39-40; Andrejevich, 22 February 1991, 40; Andrejevich, 28 June 1991, 36). Milošević stated that, “the [current] borders between</td>
</tr>
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compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs.

| Republics in Yugoslavia will never become state borders” (Moore, 20 September 1991, 38). After crushing Albanian protests following reimposition of Serbian control in Kosovo, spoke of using force if necessary to defend Serb interests in Yugoslavia (Judah 2008, 68). Support for cultural but not political autonomy for Kosovo Albanians (although cultural autonomy was sharply restricted in practice, for example in education). In run-ups to wars in Croatia and Bosnia, supported local Serb efforts to acquire arms, consolidate local power, and set up de facto statelets. Appeared to negotiate on partition of Bosnia with Croatia, including possible Muslim “buffer state.” Criticized Slovenian and Croatian moves toward independence, but responded by supporting an expanded Serbian state that would encompass the large Serb communities in Croatia and Bosnia. Made some statements in support of Serb interests in Macedonia, but didn’t show any significant interest in imposing Serbian control. (For general discussions, see Burg and Shoup 1999, 102-4, 191-4; Silber and Little 1996, 70-81, 95-104, 113-4, 119-46; Tanner 2001, 242-3) |
| Seized power in Kosovo in 1989, but was not resisted by Kosovo Albanians (Andrejevich, 5 January 1990, 34; Andrejevich, 2 March 1990, 40-1; Andrejevich, 27 July 1990, 48-9). Accepted secession of Slovenia as means of gaining control over Yugoslav presidency, state, and especially JNA (Andrejevich, 6 September 1991, 32). Subsequently negotiated secession of Macedonia. Initiation of war, terrorism, and ethnic cleansing in Croatia war (Andrejevich, 16 August 1991; Gow, 15 May 1992, 19-20; Moore, 3 January 1992, 70-1; Shoup, 13 December 1991). Similar initiation of war, terrorism, and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia (Hayden, 28 May 1993, 8-9). Croatia war onset and strategy led to shift of international (especially European) approach from emphasizing territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, to declaring Yugoslavia “dissolved” and recognizing any Republics that seceded through a democratic process (Moore, 6 September 1991, 34-5; Moore, 20 December 1991). Bosnia war onset and strategy led to international economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro alone (Dyker and Bojićić, 21 May 1993). Terror and ethnic cleansing also conducted on a larger scale and more systematically, as compared with rivals. Many of the worst atrocities were committed by paramilitaries informally supported from Serbia proper and also used as internal political enforcers. Despite objections by Panić, |

2) Actions indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment.
said and did nothing to stop paramilitaries’ near-complete ethnic cleansing of Croats from Vojvodina. In general, little effort to protect status even of non-Albanian internal minorities. No commitment to democracy in Serbia, with political enemies targeted for harassment, beatings, and sometimes killings; disloyal official fired, elections regularly manipulated (Andrejevich, 26 March 1993, 23; Markotich, 30 January 1995, 58-9; Markotich, 27 December 1996). Milošević was careful to impose control over YPA and Serbian paramilitaries, but unlike Tudjman, not so directly over his Serb proxies in Croatia and Bosnia. Showed a greater concern for control in Serbia than for control over strategic objectives in Croatia and Bosnia wars (Gow, 15 May 1992). Independent mass media almost entirely suppressed. Milošević always seemed weakly committed to specific Greater Serbia goals (Gow, 15 May 1992, 20). From 1994, Milošević applied increasing pressure on Bosnian Serbs to make concessions, foreshadowing his negotiations and agreement at Dayton, which later imposed a settlement (Gow, 7 January 1994, 133; Markotich, 11 August 1994; Moore, 30 January 1995, 24-5; Markotich, 30 January 1995, 56-8). Late 1995 Croatian and Bosnian Croat-Muslim offensives were not resisted by Milošević, including “Z4 Plan” for autonomy in Croatian Serb regions (Burg and Shoup 1999, 171-81, 306-11, 331-7; Goldstein 1999, 226-38; Tanner 2001, 278-9).

Use of force to achieve nationalist goals in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia was feasible, given collapse of all-Yugoslav institutions, significant relative military, economic and demographic strength, not only against much weaker Kosovo Albanians and Bosnian Muslims, but also against stronger Croatia. But initiation of war in Croatia and Bosnia, and initiation and more extensive use of terrorism and ethnic cleansing in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, led to repeated international intervention that tipped military balance against Serbia. While strategies of conflict may have been useful in taking and keeping internal political power, they were a foreseeable disaster for Serbian and Serb national interests—particularly after the first Croatia war, by late 1991. In Dayton Agreements, formally accepted defeat in Croatia, and severe setback in Bosnia.

3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning other political goals or in personal life.

Campaigned for leadership of Serbian nationalist movement in 1987, despite lack of any previous commitment to the cause. Claimed simultaneous commitment to socialist principles, especially through his wife’s political activities. But routinely violated socialist
principles in economic policymaking as well as in nationalities policies. Intervention in support of Montenegrin political allies, from January 1989, advanced short-term goal of gaining voting or blocking power in Yugoslav collective presidency (Andrejevich, 5 January 1990, 34). But the potential long-term consequence of alienating Montenegrin public from Serbia was largely ignored, contributing to Montenegro’s ultimate secession from Federal Yugoslavia (Andrejevich, 22 November 1991). Little evidence of consistent commitment to any substantive principles.

<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.</strong></th>
<th>Little evidence of strong ideological commitment in early life and career. Before making bid for control of Serbia, was an “anonymous, great apparatchik” advanced by his patron Stambolić (Judah 2008, 64-8). In a long career as an LC functionary, rose quietly to a high position within the Serbian LC by 1986. After 1997, when Kosovo Liberation Army-led attacks and decentralized fighting commenced, ethnic cleansing and large-scale refugee flows twice prompted international intervention—the second time including bombing and invasion preparations that led to loss of Kosovo (Judah 2008, 75-102). Acquiesced in 1999 Kosovo defeat by withdrawing, albeit without formal acceptance. Concessions occurred only when threat of military defeat became imminent.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations.</strong></td>
<td>Unlike the situations in Slovenia and Croatia, “Serbian dissidents, especially left-oriented and nationalist intellectuals, were assigned a relatively insignificant role…” (Andrejevich, 20 July 1990, 41). Did not support leaders of stature within Serbian Socialist Party—rather eliminated or marginalized them where they existed or emerged, as occurred with Ćosić and Panić. Same approach taken to non-Party allies such as Šešelj (Andrejevich, 26 March 1993; Gow, 7 January 1994, 127-9; Markotich, 22 April 1994). Delayed democratic opening longer than in other Yugoslav Republics (Andrejevich, 20 July 2990, 40). No commitment to internal party and general democracy; rather, used violence and other state powers extensively to prevent political rivals from emerging or consolidating.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:**

| **1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict.** | Having hitherto shown little interest in Serbian nationalism in prior career as banker and party cadre and reliable loyalist of Yugoslav communism, Milošević used April 1987 Kosovo Polje speech to assume leadership of Serbian nationalist movement—following which he immediately purged Stambolić and other rivals from Serbian LC and |

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state. (Goldstein 1999, 202-4; Silber and Little 1996, 31-47). Avoided limelight and was by every indication a reliable communist, until made bid for control of Serbia by “playing nationalist card” (Judah 2008, 65). Prewar move of Socialist Party (reformed Serbian LC) away from relations with Yugoslav LC also contradicted Milošević’s appeal for unity of the LC Yugoslavia (Andrejevich, 20 July 1990). Before and in early stages of wars, took strong nationalist positions; but as political and military conditions deteriorated, struck more compromising, ordinary nationalist poses. Rhetoric also varied dramatically in run-up to elections, apparently depending on Milošević’s perception of the Serbian public’s mood (Andrejevich, 21 December 1990, 33, 35-6). Used mass mobilizing methods to take power in Serbia; but restricted their use by the Serbian political opposition (Andrejevich, 20 July 1990, 42). (For a general discussion, see Đukić 2001.)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.</th>
<th>From 1987, never took actions that threatened his personal power in order to pursue proclaimed ideological goals. Rather, pursued or retreated from confrontation in manner that seemed calculated to solidify power.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders.</td>
<td>Massive corruption among peers or subordinates cultivated as means to retain power and achieve political goals (Bićanić, 29 May 1992, 48; Minić, 27 August 1993).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Categorization: Strongly power-seeking (3). Toward Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnian Muslims, veered back and forth between more uncompromising strong nationalism (4) before and sometimes during conflicts, to more compromising ordinary nationalism (3) when wars went badly and political legitimacy was weakened. Took non-nationalist (1) position toward Slovenia and Macedonia in face of early resistance to recentralization of LC power in Yugoslavia.

Rationale: Little or no evidence of consistently principled behavior. Statements and actions in the Serbian nationalist cause became more or less extreme depending upon which seemed to deliver greater legitimacy and to minimize internal or external political threats. While consistent nationalist goals were stated from 1987, failed strategies were used repeatedly, apparently for short-term political advantage, regardless of the consequences for proclaimed nationalist goals. After political and military setbacks began to pose significant risks to political power, he showed little hesitation in accepting concessions and outcomes that were initially rejected out of hand. In the Dayton Agreements, he formally accepted defeat in Croatia, and a severe setback in Bosnia.
He acquiesced in the Kosovo defeat by withdrawing, albeit without formal acceptance. Concessions occurred only when military defeat was imminent—indicating myopic focus on political consequences rather than long-term emphasis on stated nationalist goals. Lack of consistent commitment to any substantive goals makes it implausible to categorize him even as moderately principled, e.g., in the manner of a “balanced” machine politician.

**Table A4.** Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Kosovo Albanians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Executive Leadership: Ibrahim Rugova</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderate vs. Extreme Nationalist Dimension:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Statements indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs.</td>
<td>From 1989 Serbian abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy, Rugova co-founded and led Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK), and created “shadow” political and public service institutions. Elected president in 1992. Committed to goals of making Kosovo an independent Republic within Yugoslavia, and an independent country or a union with Albania in the event of Yugoslavia’s break-up; declared Kosovo a sovereign state in September 1991 (Andrejevich, 27 July 1990, 50; Andrejevich, 18 October 1991, 25, 27; Moore, 20 December 1991, 37). But use of force to achieve independence in the short run was judged extremely difficult and costly given Serbia’s military advantage and Milošević’s ruthlessness, so a non-violent resistance strategy was chosen (Andrejevich, 2 March 1990, 44-5; Andrejevich, 18 October 1991, 25, 28; Moore, 13 December 1991, 30). For example, rejected Tudjman’s urging to open another front against Serbia. Without ready means of arming, fighting looked too dangerous, and the overwhelming majority of the population seemed to agree. In 1992, Rugova said, “We are not certain how strong the Serbian military presence in the province actually is, but we do know that it is overwhelming and that we have nothing to set against the tanks and other modern weaponry in Serbian hands….We would have no chance of successfully resisting the army. In fact the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than to be massacred” (Judah 2008, 71). Support for cultural but not political or territorial autonomy for Kosovo Serbs. Showed general willingness to compromise, except on basic issue of Kosovo independence (Judah 2008, 69-74).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Actions indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival No violence initiated against Serbian military or civilians by DLK in 1989-97 (thus in period 1990-1995). Accepted Serbian rule indefinitely as long as adverse conditions to achieve independence at a reasonable cost existed. Commitment to internal democracy and political freedoms strong (Andrejevich, 2 March 1990, 44-5). No violence or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment.</td>
<td>Harassment directed at Albanian political opponents.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning other political goals or in personal life.</td>
<td>No evidence of extremism in service of any cause or principles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.</td>
<td>Born 1944. Father and grandfather executed by partisans as they assumed power. Before 1989, Rugova did not directly oppose the Yugoslav state, but pursued an academic and journalistic career with a broad emphasis on Albanian literary culture (Judah 2008, 69-74). In early career, despite quiet commitment to Albanian nationalist cause, no evidence of ideological extremism in nationalist or other causes. During war started from 1997 by rival Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), little effort to stop KLA from targeting Serb civilians, including KLA’s retaliatory ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Serbs. After war ended in 1999, accepted de facto Serbian rule in Kosovo’s Mitrovića region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations.</td>
<td>Rugova supported many leaders of stature within the DLK, some of whom later became political rivals. Commitment to internal party and general democracy helped to yield many leaders with broadly similar preferences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict.</th>
<th>Since 1989, Rugova consistently pursued independence, along with non-violent strategies reasonably calculated to achieve it. Similar points hold for other policy goals. Before 1987, took no high-profile public ideological positions, apparently in response to restrictions of Yugoslav communism.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.</td>
<td>Born in 1944, so no opportunity to fight during World War II. Did not directly challenge incumbent Yugoslav system until Milošević’s rise in Serbia. From 1989, showed will to risk political confrontation and either arrest or violent retribution; risk was to life as well as to personal position and freedom. Arrested and jailed by Serbia during late 1990s war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes</td>
<td>No evidence of personal corruption. Some corruption tolerated in effort to build politically supportive patron-client network.</td>
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nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.

4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders. Some corruption among peers or subordinates tolerated as means to retain power and achieve political goals.

Categorization: strongly principled (1), ordinary nationalist (3) toward Serbia.
Rationale: All evidence indicates strongly principled behavior. Strength of stated commitment to independence goal, under adverse relative power conditions and in face of a determined Serbian rival, made him more than a moderate nationalist (2); care to try to limit costs in face of adverse balance of power, but also general openness of DLK and non-violence toward Kosovo Serbs, made him less than a strong nationalist (4). For as long as there was no opportunity to achieve independence at a reasonable cost, acquiesced in Serbian rule indefinitely.

**Table A5. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Slovenia**

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) <strong>Statements indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them</strong>, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs.</td>
<td>Through the April 1990 elections, LC leader Kučan resisted efforts by Serbia and the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) to recentralize power, while advocating further decentralization of power to the point of de facto independence (Andrejevich, 23 February 1990, 35, 36; Andrejevich, 2 March 1990, 37, 39; Andrejevich, 30 March 1990, 36-7). “The Yugoslav Socialist Alliance daily Borba stated that, ‘Over one-half of the voters who opted for the communist candidate [Kučan, in the April 1990 election] are neither members nor sympathizers of his party’”, and “Slovenes view Kučan ‘as the greatest protector of Slovene interests and the founder of Slovene statehood.’” (Borba quoted in Andrejevich, 27 April 1990, 36.) From April 1990 election, new Prime Minister Peterle, heading the center-right coalition “Demos” government, pursued independence peacefully, but with a declared will and rising capability to use force to take and defend it (Andrejevich, 27 July 1990, 45): “…if negotiations with the rest of Yugoslavia do not succeed, Slovenia will become an independent state.” (Andrejevich, 29 June 1990, 48). Kučan reiterated the same position (Andrejevich, 18 January 1991, 30; Andrejevich, 15 March 1991, 26-7). Kučan was elected president in 1990 and again in 1992, and closely cooperated in formulating and advancing Peterle’s policies (Andrejevich, 2 November 1990, 28-31; Gow and Carmichael 2000, 156-7, 177, 183; Rupel 1994, 190-4). Use</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of force to achieve independence was not expected to be that difficult, given collapse of all-Yugoslav institutions, lack of Serbian interest in Slovenian territory, and high Slovenian state capacity. No significant internal minorities or cross-border ethnic kin, hence no opportunity to observe statements or actions toward rival groups.

2) Actions indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment.

Following June 1991 declaration of independence, Peterle’s government used force to secure exclusive control of Slovenia’s territory (Andrejevich, Moore and Perry, 12 July 1991). During brief skirmishes before Milošević pulled backed YPA, no change to goals and norms of pre-war period. Commitment to internal democracy, with no use of force against other Slovenians. Before initial 1990 elections, Kučan’s Slovenian LC initially condemned but tolerated nationalist dissent, and defended freedom of nationalist-leaning press, while fending off pressure from YPA. But after YPA arrests of dissident journalists galvanized Committee for Defense of Human Rights (CDHR) and Slovenian nationalist opposition, Kučan and the Slovenian LC shifted toward strong support for press and political freedoms (Silber and Little 1996, 48-57). Peterle’s coalition government always showed similar tolerance, completing political liberalization process after coming to power.

3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning other political goals or in personal life.

General willingness to compromise, except on a few issues—such as independence—deemed fundamental. Democracy coupled with parliamentary system and divided institutional power also predisposed to moderation. But these institutions were chosen largely due to Kučan’s influence, and were refined under Peterle’s government (Andrejevich, 20 April 1990, 32-4).

4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.

Leaders were mostly political outsiders (like Peterle) or reformed, formerly moderate LC communists (like Kučan). In Kučan’s early LC career, he was viewed as a “party liberal,” who was at the same time diplomatic enough to survive the 1972 intra-party purge (Andrejevich, 20 April 1990, 35). Little evidence of extremism among Slovenian elites (Andrejevich, 20 April 1990, 37).

5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations.

Previous reformism of Slovenian LC and development of democracy (dubbed the “Slovenian Spring”)—again largely presided over by Kučan—helped to yield a remarkable crop of prominent, capable leaders with broadly similar, moderate or ordinary nationalist preferences (Andrejevich, 20 April 1990; Andrejevich, 4 May 1990).

Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:

1) Consistency of stated goals; and Since late 1980s, Slovene LC leader Kučan, along with
consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict. | Peterle and other Demos leaders, consistently pursued independence, along with strategies reasonably calculated to achieve it (Andrejevich, 23 February 1990, 35; Andrejevich, 2 March 1990, 37, 39; Andrejevich, 30 March 1990, 36–7). Similar points hold for other policy goals. Kučan’s stated ideological views showed a marked tendency to evolve as Slovene public opinion mobilized in favor of independence (Andrejevich, 20 April 1990). By contrast, Peterle’s ideology was much more stable.

2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict. | Willingness to risk confrontation and either arrest or war; risk to personal position and freedom greater than risk to life. Kučan’s Slovenian LC held the elections that were known to give the opposition a high probability of victory; then allowed transfer of power (Andrejevich, 27 April 1990). Same is true for Peterle and Demos coalition parties in later period.

3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict. | While Kučan was a career LC functionary, Peterle was a Catholic intellectual and technocrat. Under the old LC order, Peterle’s early career choices could be expected to rule out a high political position in the future. Consistent principles and policymaking evident in other areas, such as political and economic reform. Peterle clung to ideological positions in other areas—particularly social policy—even as they increasingly hurt his popularity and undermined his coalition government (Gow and Carmichael 2000, 157–8). Little evidence of leadership corruption. Under communism, reputed to be the least corrupt Yugoslav Republic by far.

4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders. | Little corruption among peers or subordinates.

Note on “cohabitation” of Kučan and Peterle: Slovenia’s form of government is parliamentary, so that the primary executive leader is the prime minister. The president is commander-in-chief. In practice, foreign and defense policy during the transition to independence was made by consensus. Both Kučan and Peterle, along with other members of the coalition government, were involved in decision-making (Gow and Carmichael 2000, 156–7, 177, 183; Rupel 1994, 190–4). Categorizations: Kučan, balanced (2), moderate nationalist (2); Peterle, strongly principled (3), ordinary nationalist (3).

Rationale: As commitment to resist Milošević and pursue greater Slovenian territorial self-determination showed, Kučan was closer to an ordinary nationalist (3) than to a non-nationalist (1). For Kučan, initial vagueness and flexibility about nationalist goals and reactive character of policy provides greater support for moderate nationalist (2) classification. Along with previous career path, also provides support for classifying Kučan as balanced (2) rather than purely principled (3). Peterle’s nationalist ideology was more uncompromising, though still cautious. Strong ideological commitments—on both nationalist and other issues—are evident throughout Peterle’s career.
Table A6. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Macedonia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Executive Leadership: Kiro Gligorov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderate vs. Extreme Nationalist Dimension:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) <em>Statements</em> indicating <em>the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them</em>, in the time-period examined. Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs.</td>
<td>Gligorov was the Macedonian member of the eight-member Yugoslav collective presidency. In the 1987-91 crisis years, before Yugoslavia’s break-up, he sought to preserve some kind of loose confederation—a compromise that would move toward even greater autonomy without forcing the conflict-prone decisions necessitated by a complete break-up into independent states (Andrejevich, 30 November 1990, 27; Andrejevich, 17 May 1991, 24). Emphasized commitment to negotiated reorganization of Yugoslavia into a looser confederation, and explicitly rejected “unilateral acts” such as Slovenia’s and Croatia’s June 1991 independence declarations (Andrejevich, 12 July 1991, 27). Gligorov “repeatedly played down any aims at outright independence, apparently viewing the break-up of the state as potentially fatal to Macedonian consciousness which was still a relatively new phenomenon” (Poulton 2000, 176; Engström 2009, 108). “In Macedonia also there was, and to some extent remains, a serious fear that with the presence of large ethnic Albanian regions in the north-west bordering Albania and Kosovo, Vardar Macedonia might be truncated with the ensuing rump falling prey to predatory neighbors who view the very concept of a Macedonian nation as historically false. Thus Gligorov was justifiably cautious, but he was swept along by events” (Poulton 2000, 176). Gligorov said, “Except for the Second World War when we fought against the fascist front…in all other uprisings or wars, we have always been the loser.” And so Gligorov argued that the primary goal had to be to acquire independence without questioning existing borders and without violence—with the agreement of the rump Yugoslav authorities led by Milošević. (Liotta and Jeb 2004, 104-5) “While the Gligorov group pushed for Macedonia’s independence within a new Yugoslav framework which would include a common army, currency, and foreign policy, VMRO-DPMNE [largest center-right opposition party] rejected this even before the elections and called for complete separation from Yugoslavia together with the establishment of an independent army” (Poulton 2000, 176). The indecisive December 1990 election produced a weak technocratic government, until a center-left coalition came to power, led by the reformed communist Macedonian LC—renamed the Social</td>
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2) **Actions indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them,** in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment.

Gligorov was later able to agree with Milošević and the JNA on withdrawal and Macedonia’s independence. “…the peaceful withdrawal of the JNA from Macedonia and the country’s peaceful attainment of independence, the only such non-violent withdrawal in former Yugoslavia, must be counted a triumph for Gligorov’s diplomacy” (Poulton 2000, 177). No violence was employed against either ethnic Macedonian or ethnic Albanian political rivals. From mid-1989, there was a strong commitment to internal democracy. The September 1991 referendum on independence was overwhelmingly supported by Macedonians, but boycotted by Albanians (Poulton 2000, 177). In response to political pressure from the Serb minority—only about 2.2% of the population in 1991—the Macedonian government agreed to add them as a co-official minority alongside the Albanians, Turks, and Vlachs, with rights including primary and secondary education in their language (Poulton 2000, 179-80, 182). The centrist, ethnic Albanian, Party of Democratic Prosperity was a (necessary) member of the coalition government from December 1990. Additional concessions were subsequently made on cultural and economic issues, such as university education in Albanian, and increased Albanian access to police and civil service jobs. Gligorov repeatedly defended such concessions, and argued that they were in the interests of Macedonians as well as Albanians. He said, “All this requires time, preparation, argumentation, patience” (Liotta and Jeb 2004, 70-1).

3) **Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning other political goals or in personal life.**

Gligorov showed a general willingness to compromise—with Albanians, Serbs, and even on the goal of Macedonian independence. Following elections, democracy coupled with a parliamentary system and divided institutional power also predisposed to moderation. But Gligorov and the Macedonian LC were responsible for creating these institutions.
4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.

Leaders were mostly former moderate communists. Gligorov was a longtime close associate of Tito, and a high-level party technocrat within the Yugoslav LC, elevated repeatedly to higher, more politically sensitive positions (Andrejevich, 17 May 1991, 23; Phillips 2004, 46-7).

5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations.

Previous reformism of Macedonian LC and development of democracy helped yield many prominent, capable leaders with broadly similar, relatively moderate nationalist preferences (Andrejevich, 30 November 1990).

### Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:

1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record before and after the period of potential conflict.

Since mid-to-late 1980s, as the conflicts intensified among Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia, Gligorov and the Macedonian LC cautiously pursued greater autonomy, while avoiding a precipitous break with Yugoslavia out of fear of Serbia and its other neighbors. Consistently though cautiously supported democratization and market reform. Gligorov was widely viewed as a “father figure” (Phillips 2004, 47). At the same time, “Gligorov earned the nickname ‘the fox’ for his political acumen, insight, and diplomatic skills” (Liotta and Jeb, 103).

2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.

Gligorov fought with the partisans during World War II; was blinded in one eye by a failed assassination attempt in 1995.

3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.

Gligorov was a longtime close associate of Tito, and a high-level party technocrat within the Yugoslav LC, elevated repeatedly to higher, more politically sensitive positions (Phillips 2004, 46-7). Gligorov had a “clean” personal image. Patronage and corruption in the political process were widespread, but not unusual relative to other post-communist countries.

4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders.

No unusual corruption among peers or subordinates. Intraparty democracy associated with competition among strong, independent and relatively principled leaders (Andrejevich, 30 November 1990, 27).

Categorization: Gligorov, balanced (2), moderate nationalist (2).

Rationale: Gligorov’s moderate nationalism was somewhat closer to ordinary nationalism than to non-nationalism. Even more than for Kučan, Gligorov’s initial vagueness and flexibility about nationalist goals and the reactive character of his policies provides greater support for moderate nationalist classification. To some extent, this may have been due to more adverse balance of power conditions. Showed will to make significant concessions to reassure not just Serbs, but also other minorities, especially huge Albanian minority. Political openness provides similar evidence. Preferences gradually evolved over time to fit political conditions, but, at any given time, he also won broad public support—particularly among ethnic Macedonians—for his preferred approach. Among ethnic Macedonian public, strong reputation for being a judicious, pragmatic leader.
Table A7. Leadership Preferences in Potential Ethno-Territorial Conflicts: Macedonian Albanians

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Executive Leadership: Nevzat Halili of Party for Democratic Prosperity, and in 1994-1995, also Arben Xhaferi of People’s Democratic Party</th>
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### Moderate vs. Extreme Nationalist Dimension:

1) *Statements indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time-period examined.* Includes will to initiate violence against the rival group in given relative power conditions; any proposed compromise agreements to avoid violence; will to initiate violence against own-group rivals; norms toward rival group, including legitimate goals and costs.

Initially dominant Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) sought greater local political autonomy through decentralization of municipal government (but not territorial autonomy), more equal legal recognition and political and civil service representation, and improved cultural rights and economic development within the existing political system (Andrejevich, 30 November 1990, 28). The smaller People’s Democratic Party of Albania (PDA), which emerged under Xhaferi in 1994, though making greater demands, was also committed to operating within the existing political system. Yet, along with Macedonian Albanian public opinion, both parties identified strongly with the cross-border Kosovo Albanians and with Albania proper. The PDP was divided between factions seeking autonomy, links with Albania, and those “seeking a civic rather than an ethnic state of Macedonia” (Poulton 2000, 184). Initial PDP leader Halili (elected August 1990, replaced February 1994) “expressly denied this [affiliation with Rugova’s DLK and desire for secession] and acknowledged the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Macedonia and Yugoslavia and the inviolability of Yugoslavia’s borders, and confirmed commitment to its federal arrangement. Such statements, however, had to be seen in the light of the then situation of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, an oppressed minority able for the first time to operate openly and faced by authorities dominated by a hostile majority nationality which itself viewed the future with some alarm” (Poulton 2000, 134-5; also Andrejevich, 30 November 1990, 28-9). Halili maintained “good relations” with Gligorov. Educational grievances included lack of an Albanian-language university, and a fall in the number of Albanian-language secondary schools—although almost all received primary education in Albanian. There was continued disagreement over citizenship standards; over whether the constitution should be changed to be purely “civic,” and if not, whether Albanians should receive greater official recognition. In general, Halili’s stated ideal was not independence, but first autonomy, and later movement toward consociationalist-type arrangements (Liotta and Jeb...
In February 1994, the PDP was taken over by the more strongly nationalist leadership of Arben Xhaferi, which soon formed the new Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) (Phillips 2004, 68). “The DPA appears to be [in mid-to-late 90s] steadily eclipsing the PDP among young voters, especially in the crucial centers of Tetovo and Gostivar. But one must be careful not to over-stress the split between the PDP and the DPA; their essential difference was over tactics, with the PDP continuing to participate in coalition governments and the DPA tending to play the national card more and engage in confrontation and withdrawal….Xhaferi boycotted the parliament” (Poulton 2000, 197; also Liotta and Jeb 2004, 15-6). “Xhaferi has a tendency to equate the Macedonian Albanian situation to that of Kosovo, and to stress Albanian unity.” In the run-up to the October 1998 elects, PDA goals were “…a bi-national Macedonian state; constitutional status for the Macedonian Albanians; a ‘democracy of consensus’ and mechanisms for decision-making on such consensus; the institution of an Albanian deputy head of state to supervise the fair operation of the state on ethnic matters; educational, cultural and other national institutions to affirm Albanian values in general; and the creation of an institution for regional development. On Kosovo he offered political and financial solidarity and, if the situation deteriorated, military involvement. Thus, while there are certainly strong parallels between the Kosovars and the Albanians in Macedonia, there are basic differences—most notably that the Kosovars’ starting point is independence, while the Macedonian Albanians’ is equal participation in a bi-national state….while the DPA seemed to be following the Kosovo route of non-participation, the PDP remained in government….If the possibility of the Kosovo Albanians co-existing in the same state as the Serbs seems virtually non-existent, the situation in Macedonia seems more hopeful although it is hard to overestimate the Albanians’ desire for unity” (Poulton 2000, 198-9).

<p>| 2) Actions indicating the nature and intensity of nationalist goals and the costs and downside risks accepted in pursuing them, in the time-period examined. Includes initiation of violence against rival group in given relative power conditions; acceptance of compromise proposals to end | No PDP or DPA use of force to change the status quo within Macedonia. Albanians started unofficial university and the Macedonian state later accepted it. Compromise was reached over issues such as increasing Albanian representation in police, courts and civil service. This was facilitated by PDP participation in the governing coalition with Gligorov’s Social Democratic Union until October 1998, with five PDP cabinet ministers (Liotta and Jeb 2004, 67; Poulton 2000, 184-91). Operated peacefully within |</p>
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<th><strong>violence; initiation of violence toward own-group rivals; treatment of rival group, including substantive concessions and treatment.</strong></th>
<th>democratic system. Norms observed both toward Macedonians and Albanians.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3) Indirect evidence in the time-period examined: moderation or extremism concerning other political goals or in personal life.</strong></td>
<td>General willingness to compromise, including commitment to operating within the democratic system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4) Direct and indirect evidence of moderation or extremism, before and after the period of potential conflict.</strong></td>
<td>Leaders were mostly political outsiders. Halili was an English teacher. Xhaferi was a journalist and film editor (Phillips 2004, 68-9). In summer 1997, the more strongly nationalist DPA raised Albanian flags alone over city halls, prompting polarizing clashes and trials. From December 1997, bombs were set off occasionally by the newly formed Macedonian KLA offshoot (Poulton 2000, 189-90; Phillips 2004, 69-72). As a result, the DPA called for a boycott of state institutions. In October 1998 elects, VRMO-DPMNE became the largest party, and the DPA surpassed PDP. But then DPA entered coalition government with VRMO-DPMNE, and amnesty for prisoners included those involved in the Albanian flag incidents. Yet inter-ethnic tensions and clashes continue to create a high risk of civil war. Huge Kosovo Albanian refugee flows in 1998-99 amounted to 10% of Macedonia’s population and led to tensions over Macedonian government’s efforts to control the inflow (Poulton 2000, 199-201; Phillips 2004, 72). (In 1999, there was significant spillover of KLA violence from Kosovo, leading to local fighting and stalemate, which marginalized both the PDP and DPA relative to the Macedonian KLA. Early NATO mediation and peacekeeping was probably necessary to prevent a civil war from developing and to broker a new political compromise. This compromise made some more concessions to Albanians, but did not qualitatively change the old status quo. This episode, including the emergence of new Macedonian Albanian leadership outside the PDP and DPA, is beyond the time-period addressed in this paper.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5) Moderate or extremist characteristics of promoted or supported fellow leaders within own political organizations.</strong></td>
<td>Development of democracy generated many prominent, capable leaders with broadly similar, relatively moderate or strong nationalist preferences. Xhaferi’s emergence as a rival to Halili itself shows internal democracy of PDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principled vs. Unprincipled Dimension:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1) Consistency of stated goals; and consistency of strategies with stated goals. Includes record</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>before and after the period of potential conflict.</td>
<td>within the existing political system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Will to take political or personal risks to achieve stated goals. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.</td>
<td>Both Halili and Xhaferi showed a willingness to risk confrontation to pursue limited goals; risk to personal position and freedom greater than risk to life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Evidence of principled beliefs and behavior in other policy areas and in personal life. Includes nature and extent of personal and client corruption. Includes record before and after period of potential conflict.</td>
<td>No unusual personal corruption. Political patronage and corruption were widespread, but not unusual relative to other post-communist countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Principled or unprincipled characteristics of promoted and supported fellow leaders.</td>
<td>No unusual corruption among peers or subordinates.</td>
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</table>

Categorizations: Vis-à-vis Macedonia, Halili of the PDP was a strongly principled (3), moderate nationalist (2); Xhaferi of the DPA was a strongly principled (3), ordinary nationalist (3).

Rationale: Neither PDP nor DPA demanded independence, and so fell short of what Rugova demanded in Kosovo. Both operated within the democratic system, although Xhaferi was willing to rely more on defiance, friction and stalemate to apply pressure for concessions. Both were in a less adverse balance of power situation than was Rugova. Given balance of power conditions, strong nationalists would not have committed themselves to this much restraint. For both leaders, consistency of principles, along with will to take personal and political risks in pursuit of them, indicates strongly principled.
References


